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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1977, Robert J. Kutak1 was named chairman of a newly-created American Bar Association (“ABA”) Committee on Evaluation of
† Professor, St. Mary’s University School of Law, San Antonio, Texas. Thanks to
my research assistant Dorian Ojemen for his excellent research and for his editorial
assistance.
1. On the life and work of Robert Kutak, see KUTAK ROCK LLP, A CELEBRATION OF
THE LIFE OF ROBERT J. KUTAK (“CELEBRATION”) (on file with author). I am grateful to
the members and employees of Kutak Rock LLP, especially Marilynn Herek, for allowing me to look through all of Robert J. Kutak’s extant papers (save any documents
protected by the attorney-client privilege) and for copying without charge any item I
found of interest, including the CELEBRATION. Given his accomplishments, the YALE
BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN LAW disserved lawyers in failing to include his
biography, particularly given its inclusion of others who did little or nothing to shape
the history of the American legal profession. See, e.g., Jeffrey Abramson, Simpson,
Orenthal James (O. J.), in YALE BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN LAW 497
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Ethical Standards (“Kutak Commission”).2 ABA President William B.
Spann, Jr., asked the Commission to look at “all facets of legal ethics.”3 Though Kutak apparently knew little or nothing about legal
ethics rules and guidelines, he was an inspired choice.4 He was a relentless optimist, building from scratch a national law firm based in
Omaha, Nebraska. Although just in his mid-forties, he was an active
and long-serving member of the ABA.5 Finally, he possessed a large
appetite for work and public service,6 joined by more than a little personal ambition.

(Roger K. Newman ed., 2009). In addition to the CELEBRATION, see also David
Margolick, R.J. Kutak, Leader in Bar Ethics Work, Dies, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 1983, at
D25; ROBERT J. KUTAK, http://www.kutakrock.com/robert-bob-kutak/ (last visited February 1, 2016).
2. The Committee on Evaluation of Ethical Standards initially consisted of ten
lawyers. In February 1978, the Kutak Commission urged the Board of Governors to add
two non-lawyers and one private practice lawyer, changing it, in ABA argot, from a
special “committee” to a special “commission.” See COMMISSION ON EVALUATION OF PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS. JOURNALS, WASHINGTON, D.C., FEBRUARY 24-25, 1978, at 30 (n.d.)
[hereinafter “JOURNALS”] (on file with author). The ABA agreed. For the sake of consistency, I will use “Commission” throughout.
3. William B. Spann, Jr., The Legal Profession Needs a New Code of Ethics, 2 B.
LEADER, Nov.-Dec. 1977, at 2, 3.
4. This assertion is based on my conversation with firm co-founder Harold Rock
on Wednesday, December 10, 2014, during which he told me that both he and Kutak
were asked to chair the Special Committee. They agreed that Rock would continue to
work on firm business and Kutak would agree to serve as Chairman. Rock was a member of the ABA’s House of Delegates beginning in the 1971-72 year as a representative
of the Nebraska State Bar Association. See 97 A.B.A. ANN. REP. 17A (1972) (listing
members from Nebraska). He also served on the Standing Committee on Professional
Responsibility from 1974-79. See 99 A.B.A. ANN. REP. (1974) (listing members) through
104 A.B.A. ANN. REP. (1979) (listing members). In the 1976-77 year, both Rock and
Kutak were members of the House of Delegates, the latter representing the Section on
Individual Rights and Responsibilities as its past Chairman. See 102 A.B.A. ANN. REP.
19A (1977) (listing members from Nebraska). Interview with Harold Rock, co-founder,
Kutak Rock LLP, in Omaha, NE. (Dec. 10, 2014).
5. Kutak became a member of the Council of the Section on Individual Rights and
Responsibilities in 1971. See Dates, Places, and Attendance of Annual Meetings, 96
A.B.A. ANN. REP. 71 (1971). He rose in office in the Section, becoming Vice-Chair in
1972-73, Chair-Elect in 1973-74, and Chair in 1974-75. See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION,
ADVANCING THE LAW, PROTECTING THE INDIVIDUAL, DEFENDING HUMAN DIGNITY, PURSUING THE CHALLENGES INTO THE 21ST CENTURY: A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN BAR
ASSOCIATION SECTION OF INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES 45-46 (1999) [hereinafter “ADVANCING THE LAW”] (listing officers and council members, but listing Kutak as
joining the Council in 1970 and not serving in the 1971-72 year).
6. In addition to his ABA work, Kutak served as a member of the board of the
Legal Services Corporation from 1975-1981. See email from Courtney Belmi, Office of
Government Relations & Public Affairs, Legal Services Corporation, to author (January
28, 2016, 11:23 a.m.) (on file with author); see also ROBERT J. KUTAK, http://
www.kutakrock.com/robert-bob-kutak/ (last visited February 1, 2016). The firm notes
in its tribute to Kutak that one of his favorite sayings was “Work is Joy.”
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Kutak died of a heart attack at age 50 in January 1983.7 The
next month, at its Midyear Meeting, the ABA’s House of Delegates
(“the House”) spent five sessions voting on provisions of the Kutak
Commission’s proposed Model Rules of Professional Conduct.8 Delegates offered amendments from the first rule (Rule 1.1) to the next-tolast (Rule 8.4).9 It was not until the next meeting of the House, in
August 1983, that the Model Rules were adopted.10 One delegate was
pleased to state that “there had been a tremendous spirit of cooperation” since February 1983, in sharp contrast to the “confusion, antagonism, and polarization of viewpoints experienced a year earlier.”11
The Model Rules were adopted in the face of significant disagreement
among lawyers and representatives of bar associations and other bar
groups.12 In contrast, when the ABA adopted its 1969 Code of Professional Responsibility, it did so without any amendment or recorded
dissent.13 Why did such strong disagreement exist less than fifteen
years after the wholehearted adoption of the Code of Professional
Responsibility?
This essay argues that the six-year effort to craft the Model Rules
of Professional Conduct was the last hurrah14 of optimism in the
American legal profession. When the Model Rules project began in
1977, the ABA embraced the idea that lawyers enjoyed a central role
7. Service is Set Wednesday for Lawyer Robert Kutak, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD,
Jan. 24, 1983, reprinted in CELEBRATION.
8. See Proceedings of the 1983 Midyear Meeting of the House of Delegates, 108
A.B.A. ANN. REP. 289, 291-369 (1983).
9. See id. For a critical early assessment, see Gerard J. Clark, Commentary, Fear
and Loathing in New Orleans: The Sorry Fate of the Kutak Commission’s Rules, 17 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 79 (1983). The House had already spent significant time on just one
rule, the rule on fees, Rule 1.5, at its Annual Meeting in August 1982. See Proceedings of
the 1982 Annual Meeting of the House of Delegates, 107 A.B.A. ANN. REP. 603, 603-24
(1982). It was unable to reach any agreement then on the rule on client confidences,
Rule 1.6, and deferred consideration until the 1983 Midyear Meeting. See id. at 624-29.
10. See Proceedings of the 1983 Annual Meeting of the House of Delegates, 108
A.B.A. ANN. REP. 763, 778 (1983).
11. See id. at 766.
12. That disagreement continued in the adoption process in the states, and many
adapted rather than adopted the Model Rules. In Texas, for example, the process to
adopt the Rules began in 1984, but was not completed until 1989, in part due to “outright errors and omissions” in the Model Rules, in part due to the need to conform the
Rules to “long-standing Texas practices,” and in part due to the conclusion “that the
ABA had simply erred in making certain policy determinations in a number of areas.”
See John F. Sutton, Jr. & Robert P. Schuwerk, Introduction, 27A HOUS. L. REV. 1, 2
(1990); see also Texas’ New Disciplinary Rules Become Effective Jan. 1, 1990, 52 TEX.
B.J. 1023 (1989).
13. See House of Delegates Proceedings, 94 A.B.A. ANN. REP. 378, 389-92 (1969)
(adopting Code without amendment).
14. With apologies to the late novelist Edwin O’Connor. See Edwin O’Connor, THE
LAST HURRAH (1956) (chronicling the fall of an Irish-American mayor in an unnamed
city that appears to be Boston).
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in the exercise of political power, for it believed that lawyers were
largely a force for social good. Lawyers were crucial to maintaining
the rule of law, as recently demonstrated in the resignation from office
of President Richard Nixon. Thus, though lawyers were deeply involved in the crimes of Watergate, they were also crucial to uncovering
those crimes.15
The Model Rules of Professional Conduct were intended to serve
as another demonstration of the ways in which lawyers acted to aid
the public. The Model Rules would remedy several distinct problems
found in the Code of Professional Responsibility,16 but more importantly, respond to the public’s negative view of lawyers in the aftermath of Watergate. The Kutak Commission’s initial draft of the
Model Rules reflected the belief that law remained a public profession,17 and that lawyers served as both agents of their clients and as
trustees of the public interest.18 By the end of the drafting and approval process, the idea of the lawyer as servant of the public had disappeared, as optimism waned regarding the capacity of lawyers to
shape a better society. The final version of the Model Rules focused
almost exclusively on the private market model of the lawyer’s duty of
loyalty to the client. It adopted a variant of Oliver Wendell Holmes’s
“bad man”19 philosophy to legal ethics, and its Chairman coined a new
and telling phrase, the “law of lawyering.”20
15. See Michael Ariens, The Agony of Modern Legal Ethics, 1970-1985, 5 ST.
MARY’S J. ON MALPRACTICE AND LEGAL ETHICS 134, 174-77 (2014) (noting the impact of
Watergate on the legal profession). Watergate was known, even among lawyers, as a
“lawyers’ scandal.” See Richard B. Allen, et al., Editorial, Watergate—A Lawyers’ Scandal?, 60 A.B.A. J. 1257 (1974) (quoting past ABA President Chesterfield Smith’s observation); James D. Fellers, President’s Page, 61 A.B.A. J. 529, 529 (1975) (“Early in its
development, Watergate was characterized as a lawyer’s scandal.”).
16. See generally Thomas D. Morgan, The Evolving Concept of Professional Responsibility, 90 HARV. L. REV. 702 (1977).
17. See ROSCOE POUND, THE LAWYER FROM ANTIQUITY TO MODERN TIMES 5 (1953)
(“[A profession is] a group . . . pursuing a learned art as a common calling in the spirit of
public service—no less a public service because it may incidentally be a means of livelihood.”); see generally ALFRED Z. REED, TRAINING FOR THE PUBLIC PROFESSION OF THE
LAW (1921).
18. See generally STEVEN BRINT, IN AN AGE OF EXPERTS (1994) (defining social trustee professionalism).
19. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 459
(1897) stating,
If you want to know the law and nothing else, you must look at it as a bad man,
who cares only for the material consequences which such knowledge enables
him to predict, not as a good one, who finds his reasons for conduct, whether
inside the law or outside of it, in the vaguer sanctions of conscience.
See also ALBERT W. ALSCHULER, LAW WITHOUT VALUES 144-50 (2000) (critiquing “bad
man” theory); G. EDWARD WHITE, JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES: LAW AND THE INNER SELF 222 (1993) (noting “the positivistic nature of law in [Holmes’s] ‘bad man’
metaphor.”).
20. Robert J. Kutak, The Next Step in Legal Ethics: Some Thoughts on the Proposed Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 30 CATH. U. L. REV. 1, 3 (1980) (“In other
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Section II provides a brief introduction to the members of the
Kutak Commission and its Reporters. Section III discusses the general ethical framework of the members of the Kutak Commission, a
framework anchored by a belief that lawyers served in the public interest. Section III then examines the drafts of the Model Rules, and
the strong reactions to those drafts. Section IV discusses the competing visions of proper lawyer behavior from 1977 to 1983. It further
explains why the Commission’s view that lawyers acted as trustees on
behalf of the public was displaced in the adopted Model Rules by a
market model that equated a private lawyer’s work for clients as serving the public interest. These competing visions were evidence of a
fracturing within the American legal profession. A lack of cultural
unity among lawyers heightened the importance of rules as framing
the bounds of permissible lawyer behavior. Section IV ends with an
evaluation of the consequences of cultural fragmentation, including
the death of optimism. Section V offers a brief conclusion.
II. THE KUTAK COMMISSION
A. ROBERT KUTAK
Robert Kutak was born in October 1932, the son of a Czech immigrant.21 After graduating from the University of Chicago Law School
in 1955, he worked as a judicial clerk and then for Nebraska Republican Senator Roman Hruska until he, Harold Rock, and William
Campbell formed Kutak Rock & Campbell in 1965.
Kutak was active in the ABA’s Section on Individual Rights and
Responsibilities by the early 1970s, becoming its Chairman in 1974.22
This Section played a small role in supporting the civil rights movement. It played a more important role in shifting the ABA from an
inward-looking to an outward-focused institution23 that spoke well beyond traditional legal institutional goals such as the creation of Law
Day24 and World Peace Through Law.25 Kutak was appointed in 1975
words, the natural process of change—of evolution—that affects every area of American
law has affected the ‘law of lawyering’ as well.”).
21. See Remarks of Mr. Jerome F. Kutak, in CELEBRATION, at 1 (printing remarks of
Robert Kutak’s father) (on file with author).
22. See 96 A.B.A. ANN. REP. 71 (1971) (listing Kutak as member of the Council of
the Section); see also 100 A.B.A. ANN. REP. 106A (1975) (listing Kutak as Chairman of
the Section).
23. See ADVANCING THE LAW, supra note 5, at 9-13; see also Michael Ariens, Sorting: Specialization and the Privatization of the American Legal Profession, 29 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 579 (2016) (discussing change in ABA focus in mid-1960s); see also infra
§ IV.B.
24. Law Day was created by the ABA and first promulgated by President Dwight
D. Eisenhower in 1958. See The President’s Proclamation, 44 A.B.A. J. 342, 343 (1958)
(approving May 1st as Law Day); see also Jason Krause, Charlie Rhyne’s Big Idea, 94
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to the inaugural board of the Legal Services Corporation, which was
created in 1974 by Congress to serve the civil legal needs of the poor.26
He left the Corporation’s board in 1981.27
B. MEMBERS

OF THE

KUTAK COMMISSION

The Kutak Commission initially comprised a group of ten serviceoriented lawyers and judges largely conversant with the internal
politics of the ABA. Its members included two judges, federal judge
Marvin Frankel28 and Alabama Supreme Court Justice Howell Heflin.29 Two members were past presidents of influential American legal institutions in the United States:30 Robert Meserve31 was a past
president of the ABA, and Samuel Thurman32 was a past president of
A.B.A. J. 62, 65 (2008) (crediting ABA President Charlie Rhyne with creating Law Day);
David Ray Papke, Law Day, in OXFORD COMPANION TO AMERICAN LAW 491 (2002).
25. The ABA’s World Peace Through Law initiative was created the same year as
Law Day. See Charles S. Rhyne, World Peace Through Law, 83 A.B.A. ANN. REP. 624
(1958).
26. Legal Services Corporation Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2996-2996l (2015). The bill was
signed into law by President Richard M. Nixon on July 25, 1974, two weeks before he
resigned from office, and just days before the House Committee on the Judiciary voted
in favor of articles of impeachment. See EARL JOHNSON, JR., 2 TO ESTABLISH JUSTICE FOR
ALL: THE PAST AND FUTURE OF CIVIL LEGAL AID IN THE UNITED STATES 424 (3 vols.,
2014); EARL JOHNSON, JR., Foreword to the New Edition in JUSTICE AND REFORM: THE
FORMATIVE YEARS OF THE AMERICAN LEGAL SERVICES PROGRAM ix-xxi (2d ed., 1978); see
also ALAN W. HOUSEMAN & LINDA E. PERLE, SECURING EQUAL JUSTICE FOR ALL: A BRIEF
HISTORY OF CIVIL LEGAL ASSISTANCE IN THE UNITED STATES 19-27 (rev. 2007) (discussing
the creation and early history of Legal Services Corporation).
27. See email from Courtney Belmi, Office of Government Relations & Public Affairs, Legal Services Corporation, to author (January 28, 2016, 11:23 a.m.) (on file with
author).
28. See Gary P. Naftalis, Frankel, Marvin E., in YALE BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY OF
AMERICAN LAW at 203.
29. See Tony A. Freyer, Heflin, Howell, in YALE BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY OF
AMERICAN LAW at 259. Heflin resigned from the Commission to run for Senator. He
was replaced by Oregon Supreme Court Chief Justice Arno Denecke.
30. The past and current presidents and directors of the prestigious American Law
Institute (ALI) were few in number. None was a member of the Commission. However,
William Spann, who created and later served as a member of the Commission, was a
member of the ALI. See Wm. B. Spann, Jr., Is Nominated for President-Elect, 62 A.B.A.
J. 341 (1976). The second Reporter, Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., was a prominent member
of the ALI, and was named its Director in 1984, a position he held until 1999. Stephen
Gillers, Hazard, Geoffrey C., Jr., in YALE BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN LAW
at 259.
31. See Randy Kennedy, Robert W. Meserve, 86, Dies; Favored Stronger Legal Ethics, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 1995, at B10; TUFTS ALUMNI, http://tuftsalumni.org/who-weare/alumni-recognition/tufts-notables/luminaries-2/#meserve (last visited February 1,
2016).
32. See generally Sandra Day O’Connor, A Tribute to Samuel D. Thurman, (1996),
ce//content.lib.utah.edu/utils/getfile/collection/utlawrev/id/3561/filename/17771.pdf; Jefferson B. Fordham, In Appreciation of Samuel D. Thurman, 1975 UTAH L. REV. 1 [hereinafter “Appreciation”]; William H. Rehnquist, A Tribute to Samuel D. Thurman, 1975
UTAH L. REV. 7. Before serving as Dean at the University of Utah Law School, he was a
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the Association of American Law Schools. Another member, Robert B.
McKay,33 was a future president of the Association of the Bar of the
City of New York (“ABCNY”). McKay was a former NYU law school
dean who served on the board of a number of legal institutions, including the New York Legal Aid Society, and on the executive committee
of the ABCNY. Like McKay, Thurman was a legal academic and former law dean. Both he and McKay had written on issues of legal ethics.34 In addition to Kutak and Meserve, private practice lawyers
included Betty Binns Fletcher,35 a prominent Seattle lawyer, and
Richard H. Sinkfield,36 a relatively young Atlanta lawyer. All either
practiced or had practiced in large firms. The other two members
were Thomas Ehrlich, the first President of the Legal Services Corporation37 and a former Stanford Law School Dean, and Jane Lakes
Frank (now Harman),38 a government lawyer. Others appointed later
included in-house counsel lawyer L. Clair Nelson,39 St. Louis private
practice lawyer Robert O. Hetlage,40 both active and long-time ABA
faculty member at Stanford Law School, where fellow Kutak Commission member
Thomas Ehrlich also taught.
33. See M. Carr Ferguson, McKay, Robert Budge, in YALE BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN LAW at 373; Glenn Fowler, Robert McKay, 70, Legal Scholar Who Led
1971 Attica Panel, Dies, N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 1990, at 27; Roger J. Traynor et al., Robert
B. McKay, 50 N.Y.U. L. REV. 7 (1975).
34. See Robert B. McKay, An Administrative Code of Ethics: Principles and Implementation, 47 A.B.A. J. 890 (1961); SAMUEL D. THURMAN ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS
ON THE LEGAL PROFESSION (1970); Samuel D. Thurman, The Legal Profession Course: An
Evaluation, 41 U. COLO. L. REV. 385 (1969).
35. See Douglas Martin, Betty Binns Fletcher Dies at 89; Liberal Stalwart on the
Bench, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 2012, at A28. She was appointed a federal judge after being
named to the Kutak Commission, see id., after which she served as a consultant to the
Commission rather than as a member.
36. See RICHARD H. SINKFIELD,-LAWYER PROFILE, http://www.martindale.com/MrRichard-H-Sinkfield/867701-lawyer.htm (last visited February 1, 2016); ROGERS & HARDIN—RICHARD H. SINKFIELD, http://www.rh-law.com/Attorneys/RichardHSinkfield (last
visited February 1, 2016) (listing many accomplishments).
37. See Interview with Thomas Ehrlich, Georgetown University Law Library, National Equal Justice Library Oral History Collection 1-3 (May 2004) (copy on file with
author). In 1978, Ehrlich left the Presidency of the Legal Services Corporation (“LSC”)
to serve in the Carter Administration with responsibility for foreign aid policy. See id. at
22-23.
38. Harman later served as a member of Congress. See HARMAN, Jane L.,
(1945- ), BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY OF THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS, http://bioguide.
congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=H000213 (last visited February 1, 2016).
Harman resigned from Congress in 2011 to become President of the Woodrow Wilson
Center.
39. Nelson and Spann replaced Betty Binns Fletcher and Robert McKay. See
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT (AM. BAR ASS’N, 2d Discussion Draft 1980) (listing
members of Commission and indicating terms of Robert McKay and Betty B. Fletcher as
1977-80). On Nelson, see Death: L. Clair Nelson, DESERET NEWS, (Feb. 5, 1994), available at http://www.deseretnews.com/article/334710/DEATH—L-CLAIR-NELSON.html?
pg=all (last visited February 1, 2016).
40. Hetlage served as Chairman of the World Peace Through Law Committee of
the ABA in 1960-61. See Kenneth A. Burns, Jr., Our Younger Lawyers, 46 A.B.A. J.
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members, William B. Spann, Jr.,41 the former ABA President who created the Commission, Oregon Supreme Court Chief Justice Arno
Denecke,42 and nonlawyers Lois Harrison and Alan Barth.
The members of the Kutak Commission were geographically diverse,43 and all met a key criterion: they possessed extensive experience in and support for public-oriented legal service work. Kutak and
Thurman worked with Ehrlich when the former served on the Board
of the Legal Services Corporation.44 McKay became a member of the
New York Legal Aid Society’s Board of Directors in 1969, and was by
1971 its Vice-President and an Executive Committee member.45
Kutak, McKay, Meserve, Nelson, Spann, and Hetlage were active and
engaged ABA members. Hetlage, Meserve, and Spann attended President Kennedy’s June 21, 1963 meeting with “leaders of the Bar to discuss certain aspects of the Nation’s civil rights problem,”46 which
became the influential Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights Under
Law. Kutak and Spann had both been prominent members of the
ABA’s Section on Individual Rights and Responsibilities. Jefferson
Fordham, the driving force behind the 1966 creation of that Section,47
was a long-time friend of Thurman.48 Fletcher and Heflin had served
as leaders of their local or state bar associations. In addition, Fletcher
was a member of the ABA Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility for six years beginning in 1973-74, at which time
1247, 1249 (1960). Hetlage was named distinguished alumnus by his law school alma
mater, Washington University, in 2000. See ROBERT O. HETLAGE, http://law.wustl.edu/
alumni/pages.aspx?id=153 (last visited February 1, 2016).
41. On Spann, see Memorial to William Bowman Spann, Jr. (1912-1981), 106
A.B.A. ANN. REP. 589 (1981). As noted above, Spann and Nelson replaced McKay and
Fletcher, both of whom resigned from the Commission in 1980.
42. On Denecke, see Jim Hill, Retiring Justice’s Goals: Mediation, Golf, OREGONIAN, June 27, 1982; Pete Bysom & John Snell, Retired Chief Justice Arno Denecke Dies,
OREGONIAN, Oct. 21, 1993, at E1 (copies on file with author). My thanks to Scott Daniels of the Oregon Historical Society for finding and sending me these articles.
43. Their educational diversity was less inspiring. Of the fourteen law-trained
members who served at some point on the Commission, four graduated from Harvard
Law School, and one each from the Chicago, Columbia, Stanford, and Yale law schools.
Three went to strong state law schools, Alabama, Illinois, and Washington, and three
graduated from near-elite private law schools, George Washington University, Vanderbilt University, and Washington University.
44. See email from Courtney Belmi, Office of Government Relations & Public Affairs, Legal Services Corporation, to author (January 28, 2016, 11:23 a.m.) (on file with
author).
45. Orison S. Marden, Robert B. McKay, 50 N.Y.U. L. REV. 7, 17 (1975).
46. See ANN GARITY CONNELL, THE LAWYERS’ COMMITTEE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS UNDER
LAW: THE MAKING OF A PUBLIC INTEREST LAW GROUP 77, n. 128 (2003) (listing those who
attended meeting).
47. See ADVANCING THE LAW, supra note 5, at 9 (noting Fordham urged creation of
the section in 1963).
48. See Appreciation, supra note 32, at 1-2.
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Harold Rock, Kutak’s partner, also began serving as a member.49
Fletcher and Rock were panelists on the Advocacy part of the ABA’s
six-part Dilemmas in Legal Ethics video in 1977.50 Frankel was a former Columbia Law School professor and well-known judge and legal
writer. His controversial speech to the members of the ABCNY on the
limits of adversarial ethics had been recently published, which made
him ideal for the Commission.51 Frankel also served as chairman of
the Lawyers Committee on Human Rights for many years.52 Heflin
possessed an outstanding reputation as a reform-minded Alabama
lawyer who bested George Wallace with “the political support of African American civil rights leaders” while president of the Alabama
State Bar Association in 1965.53 In 1970, he was elected Chief Justice
of the Alabama Supreme Court by “employing a statewide political organization outside Wallace’s control.”54 Sinkfield and Harman were
near the beginning of their careers, both of which have been marked
by extensive public service. Spann, who created the Commission and
later served as a member, was also a member of the Lawyers’ Committee on Civil Rights Under Law, the American Law Institute, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, the
American College of Trial Lawyers, the American Judicature Society,
and a board member of the Atlanta Legal Aid Society.55
C. THE REPORTERS
The initial Reporter for the Kutak Commission was L. Ray Patterson, Dean of Emory University School of Law in Atlanta. Patterson
wrote a caustic critique of the ABA’s Code of Professional Responsibility published in the ABA Journal in May 1977.56 A few months later,
49. See 99 A.B.A. ANN. REP. 1974 (listing members) through 104 A.B.A. ANN. REP.
(1979) (listing members).
50. See ADVOCACY DISCUSSION GUIDE (1977) (listing Fletcher and Rock as two of
five panelists) (copy on file with author). The ADVOCACY DISCUSSION GUIDE notes that in
1977 Fletcher was also on the Council of the ABA Section on Litigation and the National
Conference of Bar Examiners, as well as on the Board of Governors of the Washington
State Bar Association. See id.
51. See Marvin Frankel, The Search for the Truth: An Umpireal View, 123 U. PA. L.
REV. 1031 (1975) (criticizing excessive adversarial zeal and offering amendments to the
Code of Professional Responsibility to limit such zeal). His talk and essay was expanded into book form in MARVIN E. FRANKEL, PARTISAN JUSTICE: TOO MUCH FIGHT?
TOO LITTLE TRUTH? EQUAL JUSTICE? (1980).
52. Naftalis, supra note 28, at 204.
53. Freyer, supra note 29, at 260.
54. Id.
55. See Wm. B. Spann, Jr., Is Nominated for President-Elect, 62 A.B.A. J. 341
(1976); Memorial to William Bowman Spann, Jr., supra note 41, at 589.
56. L. Ray Patterson, Wanted: A New Code of Professional Responsibility, 63 A.B.A.
J. 639 (1977).
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Spann, an Atlanta lawyer, announced the creation of the Kutak Commission. Patterson was named its Reporter.
Patterson and Kutak did not work well together. Each was ambitious to leave a mark on the profession through the Commission. Patterson possessed a substantial advantage in subject-matter knowledge
over Kutak, but Kutak was a dynamic and forceful leader and a quick
study. Kutak was not interested in simply adopting the Reporter’s
substantive views. By late 1978, Patterson was replaced as Reporter
by Yale Law School Professor Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. Hazard was an
important and influential Reporter who ably defended the Commission’s positions through and after the ABA’s adoption of the Model
Rules.57
D. THE ABA

AND THE

PUBLIC DUTIES

OF THE

LAWYER

When the Kutak Commission was created, ABA leaders had long
emphasized the public duties of a lawyer. For example, Chesterfield
Smith,58 ABA President during the height of the Watergate crisis,
used the ABA as a “bold, activist vehicle.”59 He urged lawyers to consider creating “an affirmative duty” to “devote some portion of his services to public interest endeavors.”60 And though he had supported
Nixon’s candidacy, Smith called for an independent counsel after
Nixon fired Archibald Cox in the infamous October 1973 “Saturday
Night Massacre,”61 declaring, “No man is above the law.”62 When
Nixon resigned the presidency in August 1974, it appeared that the
law triumphed over naked political power. Despite the fact that more
than two dozen lawyers were implicated in the Watergate scandal,63
the ABA believed it had played an important role in ending the scan57. As noted above, Hazard was also an influential member of the American Law
Institute, which thus linked all of the most important American legal institutions in the
Model Rules project. He served as director of the ALI from 1984-1999. See Gillers,
supra note 30, at 259.
58. See Chesterfield Smith; ABA Head during Watergate, WASH. POST (July 18,
2003), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/chesterfield-smith-aba-head-during-wa
tergate/2012/05/31/gJQANb9TGV_story.html (last visited February 1, 2016).
59. Jan Pudlow, Chesterfield Smith: America’s Lawyer, 77 Fl. B.J., Nov. 2003, at 8,
https://www.floridabar.org/divcom/jn/jnjournal01.nsf/c0d731e03de9828d852574580042
ae7a/1e0d4588011d7f4685256dc90057cb2c!OpenDocument&Highlight=0 (last visited
February 1, 2016).
60. Chesterfield Smith, Address of Chesterfield Smith, 26 ADMIN. L. REV. 379, 381
(1974); see also Chesterfield Smith, Lawyers Should ‘Tithe’ for the Public Interest, 2 B.
LEADER, Nov.-Dec. 1976, at 2.
61. On the Saturday Night Massacre, see Ken Gormley, ARCHIBALD COX: CONSCIENCE OF A NATION 359-72 (1997).
62. Pudlow, supra note 59, at 8.
63. See N.O.B.C. Reports on Results of Watergate-Related Charges Against Twentynine Lawyers, 62 A.B.A. J. 1337, 1337 (1976). One of those lawyers was the President,
Richard M. Nixon.
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dal. The leadership of the ABA believed its efforts demonstrated the
public duty of lawyers to protect American democracy as a central aspect of the duty to serve society.
Elite lawyers at this time also believed lawyers and law could effect transformational changes in society, swept up in President Lyndon Johnson’s call for a “Great Society.”64 Sargent Shriver, a lawyer
and President Lyndon Johnson’s director of the War on Poverty
through the Office of Economic Opportunity (“OEO”), was “proudest”
of the federal government’s legal aid program because “it had the
greatest potential for changing the system under which people’s lives
were being exploited.”65 In 1969, one lawyer involved in the War on
Poverty said, “Legal aid will have more impact on . . . our social, economic, and political structures than anything else” in domestic
politics.66
By 1977, the ABA had worked for over a decade to show that its
principal effort was service to the public, not mere self-interest. And
it had succeeded through its support for legal aid programs and in
promoting the rule of law in Watergate. The Kutak Commission was
another effort by the organized bar to reinforce the idea that lawyers
served the public good, and helped improve American social, economic,
and political structures. The Commission’s members had already
demonstrated their interest in service to the public through the many
organizations with which they were affiliated. The Commission and
the ABA would reiterate the duties of the legal profession as a public
profession through a legal ethics code that embraced public service.
The ABA saw itself as representing American lawyers,67 and it
took responsibility for repairing the reputation of lawyers. Improving
the reputation of lawyers would occur only when lawyers, in part
through the work of the Kutak Commission, demonstrated a concern
for the public as well as their paying clients. However, the Kutak
Commission’s reformation of legal ethics standards was met by a diffuse, and later open, resistance within the bar. The Kutak Commis64. See RANDALL B. WOODS, PRISONERS OF HOPE: LYNDON B. JOHNSON, THE GREAT
SOCIETY, AND THE LIMITS OF LIBERALISM 55 (2016) (quoting a snippet of Johnson’s “Great
Society” speech to University of Michigan graduates on May 22, 1964).
65. SCOTT STOSSEL, SARGE: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF SARGENT SHRIVER 443 (2004).
66. Id. at 442.
67. The ABA was officially an open membership association after it eliminated its
1912 whites-only policy in 1943. See Sessions of the Assembly, 68 A.B.A. ANN. REP. 97,
110 (1943) (adopting resolution that membership policy “is not dependent on race, creed
or color.”). For more detail, see J. CLAY SMITH, JR., EMANCIPATION: THE MAKING OF THE
BLACK LAWYER, 1844-1944 543 (1993). By 1977, the ABA counted 47.5% of all lawyers
(219,404/462,000) as members. See RICHARD L. ABEL, AMERICAN LAWYERS 290 (1989)
(listing ABA membership over time and comparing membership with the overall number of lawyers).
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sion failed to sense this resistance until it was too late to craft a more
modest ethics reform.
III. THE COMMISSION’S REFORMATION
A. THE APPROACH

OF THE

COMMISSION

“[T]here exists within the Bar a somewhat vague, though widespread apprehension over the effectiveness of the current Code and its
utility.”68
The Commission was well aware of an anxiety within the profession, resulting from a number of threats lawyers were then facing.69
At its first meeting, the Commission listed a number of “characteristics”70 propelling its approach in making an ethics code. In major
part, the Commission intended its work to assuage the public’s skepticism concerning lawyer behavior71 and to draft a comprehensive set of
ethics rules that were “easy to use and easy to understand.”72 These
particular characteristics were responsive both to lawyer involvement
in Watergate and to criticisms of the Code of Professional Responsibility.73 One additional way in which the Kutak Commission reacted to
the Code was by replacing the tripartite structure of the Code (nine
Canons, followed by Ethical Considerations, and then Disciplinary
Rules)74 with a “Restatement”-like structure, consisting of “black letter” rules followed by commentary explaining the rule.75
In addition, the Commission believed its duty went beyond modifying the ethics statements found in the ABA’s 1908 Canons of Ethics76 and its 1969 Code of Professional Responsibility.77 One common
68. Summary of Organizational Meeting Aspen, Colorado, September 29-October 2,
1977, at 1 (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). This Summary is printed on
the letterhead of the Special Committee on Evaluation of Ethical Standards.
69. For a discussion of some of those attacks, see Ariens, supra note 15, at 172-76.
70. Summary of Organizational Meeting, supra note 68, at 2.
71. The new code was “not to be perceived as a self-serving document.” See Summary of Organizational Meeting, supra note 68, at 3. This is also stated in JOURNALS,
ASPEN, COLORADO, SEPTEMBER 29-OCTOBER 1, 1977, at 8-9 (on file with author).
72. Id.
73. See Ariens, supra note 15, at 175-76 (discussing Watergate as a “lawyer’s scandal”); JEROLD S. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE: LAWYERS AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN MODERN
AMERICA 288 (1976) (“Like the Canons it replaced, [the Code] concentrated its energies
upon the preservation of a professional monopoly, not the provision of legal services.”).
74. On the reasons for the approach taken in the Code, see Michael Ariens, American Legal Ethics in an Age of Anxiety, 40 ST. MARY’S L.J. 343, 433-44 (2008) (discussing
the history of the Code of Professional Responsibility).
75. See JOURNALS, ASPEN, COLORADO, SEPTEMBER 29-OCTOBER 1, 1977, at 4 (discussing at the first meeting whether to move to a format akin to a “Restatement of
Ethics”). This had been suggested by Spann in his creation of the Commission. See
Spann, supra note 3, at 3.
76. See Transactions of the Thirty-first Annual Meeting of the American Bar Association, 31 A.B.A. ANN. REP. 3, 55, 86 (1908) (adopting Canons of Ethics).
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criticism of the Code was that its approach to legal ethics was too conservative.78 At its second meeting, when discussing the predominant
understanding within and outside the profession that the lawyer’s
duty was exclusively to the client, at least one member of the Kutak
Commission rebelled: “our Committee ought not to hesitate to promulgate statements of ethics it believes to be correct but which may not
meet with the general approval of the Bar.”79
This assertion suggests the Commission’s understanding that it
was to lead American lawyers. The Commission effectively adopted
the “law-making” approach taken by the American Law Institute in
its Second Restatement. Unlike the First Restatement, which was designed to state the law as it is, a major goal of the Second Restatement
was to state the law as it ought to be.80 This latter approach guided
the Commission during its initial effort to craft a set of ethics rules.
The Commission’s function, in significant part, was premised on the
belief that lawyers needed to be educated about the meaning of legal
professionalism.
Over the next two years, the Commission met bi-monthly. A summary of these meetings, compiled as the Commission on Evaluation of
Ethical Standards Journals (“Journals”), was written by Kutak Rock
lawyer Daniel Reynolds and was provided to each of the Commission
members.81 The Journals provide some insights into the thinking of
the Kutak Commission.
B. THE ETHOS

OF THE

COMMISSION

The Kutak Commission repeatedly discussed the extent of the
lawyer’s duty of client loyalty. Its members believed that a major
weakness of the Code was its “basic posture of ‘my client, first, last
77. See Proceedings of the 1969 Annual Meeting of the House of Delegates, 94 A.B.A.
ANN. REP. 378, 389-92 (1969) (adopting Code of Professional Responsibility).
78. See John F. Sutton, Jr., How Vulnerable Is the Code of Professional Responsibility?, 57 N.C. L. REV. 497, 497 (1979) (attributing rapid adoption of the Code “in no
small part to its generally conservative approach.”).
79. JOURNALS, NEW YORK CITY, NEW YORK, DECEMBER 16-17, 1977, at 16.
80. See Shirley S. Abrahamson, Refreshing Institutional Memories: Wisconsin and
the American Law Institute The Fairchild Lecture, 1995 WIS. L. REV. 1, 19-21 (noting a
shift in stating the law as “is” in the First Restatement and declaring the law as it
“ought” to be in the Second Restatement). Neither the ABA nor the ALI made law; both
were private legal organizations that attempted to use their influence to assist courts
and legislatures that made law.
81. Reynolds worked closely with Kutak, and attended all of the formal and informal meetings of the Commission and its members. See email from Daniel Reynolds to
author (January 21, 2016, 4:39 p.m.) (on file with author).
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and always,’ [which] allowed little room for development of the attorney’s role as an officer of the court.”82
The belief that the Commission needed to orient the lawyer’s duties away from the Code’s “basic posture” was expressed at the Commission’s earliest meetings. For example, the Commission discussed
the extent of the lawyer’s duty of loyalty to a client at its second meeting, in December 1977.83 The Securities and Exchange Commission’s
(“SEC”) approach in the National Student Marketing case84 indicated
securities lawyers might owe duties to others as well as their clients.
The Commission noted that the case suggested, “that at some point a
new ‘client’ may enter the equation: the investing public.”85
Extending the idea of “client” to an amorphous, possibly indefinable entity called the “investing public” required a re-orienting of the
duties of the lawyer. The Commission agreed in December 1977 that
its “mission” required it “to confront the ‘new law’ and ‘new ethics’ of
today and tomorrow.”86 American lawyers, particularly private practice lawyers, needed to account for “a determinable public interest”
when representing private clients.87 Although “invocation of the ‘public interest’ will not solve the question . . . it must certainly become a
part of the equation leading to the solution.”88 This discussion summarized some of the basic precepts of the Commission: first, the Commission had a mission, part of which was to react to the conservatism
of the Code by declaring a new law of legal ethics for the benefit of
both the public and lawyers. Second, a determinable public interest
82. JOURNALS, SEATTLE, WASHINGTON, JUNE 29-30, 1979, at 16 (quoting Reporter
Geoffrey Hazard). Even though this statement was made near the end of the Commission’s meetings, it represents the Commission’s ethos from its first meeting in 1977. See
Say Revised Ethics Code Will Be ‘Enforceable’, 65 A.B.A. J. 1283, 1283 (1979) (quoting
Commission member Richard Sinkfield, “A lawyer’s duty is not solely to protect the
confidences of the client. A lawyer has some duty and obligation with respect to the
administration of justice, of candor to the court.”); MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT
Chairman’s Introduction (AM. BAR ASS’N, PROPOSED FINAL DRAFT 1981 [hereinafter
“PROPOSED FINAL DRAFT”]); Spann, supra note 3, at 3.
83. See JOURNALS, NEW YORK CITY, NEW YORK, DECEMBER 16-17, 1977, at 14.
84. For a discussion of the matter, see Michael Ariens, “Playing Chicken”: An Instant History of the Battle Over Exceptions to Client Confidences, 33 J. LEGAL PROF. 239,
248-50 (2009). After the Commission’s discussion, the court issued its opinion in SEC v.
Nat’l Student Mktg. Corp., 457 F. Supp. 682 (D.D.C. 1978).
85. JOURNALS, NEW YORK CITY, NEW YORK, DECEMBER 16-17, 1977, at 14.
86. Id. It retained this view in the Discussion Draft, see MODEL RULES OF PROF’L
CONDUCT Preface (AM. BAR ASS’N, Discussion Draft 1980) [hereinafter “DISCUSSION
DRAFT”] (declaring “We have built on the Code’s foundation, but we make no apology for
having pushed beyond it. In many respects, we have been taken beyond the Model Code
by events.”); PROPOSED FINAL DRAFT, supra note 82, Chairman’s Introduction (“Our
drafting goal, in keeping with our mission, was to produce standards bottomed on the
law as it is but facing the future of a rapidly expanding and changing profession.”).
87. JOURNALS, NEW YORK CITY, NEW YORK, DECEMBER 16-17, 1977, at 14.
88. Id.
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existed and had to be accounted for by all lawyers. Third, resolving
the competing interests of a lawyer’s client and the public was not an
easy task. Fourth, the Commission would attempt to generate rules
guiding and regulating lawyer conduct based on drawing the lawyer
away from the Code’s “basic posture.” These ethical precepts were the
focus of a significant number of the meetings involving both Reporters. For example, Dean Patterson unveiled a Preliminary Working
Draft Code of Professional Standards (“Preliminary Working Draft”)
at the Commission’s third meeting.89 The “black letter” rule of Part I,
General Principles, began, “The Code of Professional Standards is
based on the policy of fairness in the practice of law on the part of both
the private and public lawyer.”90 Immediately below each black letter
provision was a “Rationale.” The rationale for this opening declaration defined the lawyer’s “fundamental task” as “to protect and implement the client’s legal rights” “in a manner consistent with ‘Equal
Justice Under Law.’ ”91 It then quoted People v. Belge: “an attorney
must protect his client’s interest, but also m[u]st observe basic human
standards of decency, having due regard to the need that the legal
system accord justice to the interests of society and its individual
members.”92
Belge was a deeply disturbing case for American lawyers. Two
Syracuse, New York, lawyers represented Robert Garrow, who was
charged with murder. Garrow told them that he had committed other,
uncharged murders, and gave his lawyers the rough location of the
murder victims’ bodies.93 The lawyers eventually searched for and
found the remains. They said nothing about their search until after
their client testified at trial.94 The community was outraged. One of
Garrow’s lawyers, Francis Belge, was indicted for failing to report the
locations of the bodies and for failing to provide the victims with a
burial. The trial court dismissed the indictment on attorney-client
privilege grounds. On appeal, the court affirmed, but in the statement
quoted above, rejected any absolute claim of attorney-client privilege,

89. See PRELIMINARY WORKING DRAFT CODE OF PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS, FEBRU6, 1978 (prepared by Reporter L. Ray Patterson) (on file with author).
90. Id. at 1.
91. Id.
92. Id. (quoting People v. Belge, 376 N.Y.S.2d 771 (N.Y. App. Div. 1975), aff’d 359
N.E.2d 377 (N.Y. 1976).
93. See RICHARD ZITRIN & CAROL M. LANGFORD, THE MORAL COMPASS OF THE AMERICAN LAWYER: TRUTH, JUSTICE, POWER, AND GREED 8-26 (2000). For the story as told by
Frank Armani, the other of Garrow’s lawyers, see TOM ALIBRANDI & FRANK H. ARMANI,
PRIVILEGED INFORMATION (1984).
94. ZITRIN & LANGFORD, supra note 93, at 17.
ARY
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and noted that it was not deciding “the ethical questions underlying
this case.”95
A policy of lawyer “fairness” to society certainly seemed contrary
to the profession’s understanding of adversarial ethics, particularly by
the late 1970s.96 By explicitly linking fairness with the limits of the
lawyer’s duty of client loyalty, the Commission was making a significant change in legal ethics. To require lawyers to undertake a “due
regard” of the legal system’s necessity to provide justice for the “interests of society and its individual members” was a strong challenge to
the Code’s perceived ethos of client loyalty above all else.97
This Preliminary Working Draft was, as acknowledged by its author, Reporter L. Ray Patterson, incomplete and occasionally inconsistent. Members voiced some disagreement with parts of the Draft,
including the idea of imposing an enforceable duty of pro bono publico98 work or requiring a lawyer to accept a client unless good reason
existed not to do so.99 Commission members urged caution, but did
not end such discussion.
By the end of 1978, the Commission noted that the “theme” of its
proposed rules regarding the lawyer as advocate was “lawyer autonomy.”100 Lawyer autonomy meant the “normative rules for advocates,
. . . should leave a lawyer free not to do what should not be done.”101
Lawyer autonomy was the traditional ideal that the lawyer remained
independent of the client.102 But the other side of lawyer autonomy
was the legal authority to do what was not forbidden. This aspect of
lawyer autonomy was muted in the Journals. Over some apparent
dissent, the Commission concluded that the duty of keeping client con95. Belge, 376 N.Y.S.2d at 771.
96. See Michael Ariens, Brougham’s Ghost, 35 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 263, 307-12 (2015)
(noting shift in understanding of the lawyer’s duty of “zealous” advocacy in 1970s).
97. See id. at 307-12 (detailing history of ethic of unbridled zealous representation
of a client). How far the Commission intended to take this approach was unclear, for
Part II of Patterson’s Preliminary Working Draft, titled The Lawyer and the Client,
largely avoided answering this question. In provision 14, the only “exceptions” to the
Duty to Maintain Confidences were client waiver and the vague standard, “as required
by law under legal process.” See PRELIMINARY WORKING DRAFT, supra note 89, at 32.
98. Pro bono publico, “for the public good.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1397 (10th ed.
2014). Pro bono, “Uncompensated, esp. regarding free legal services performed for the
indigent or for a public cause.” Id.; see also Pro bono, “For the good; used to describe
work or services (e.g. legal services) done or performed free of charge.” BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY 1082 (5th ed. 1979).
99. JOURNALS, WASHINGTON, D.C., FEBRUARY 24-25, 1978, at 25-26 (noting “caution
was expressed over any suggestion of rendering pro bono practice somehow
mandatory”).
100. JOURNALS, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA, DECEMBER 14-16, 1978, at 3.
101. Id.
102. See Michael Ariens, Know the Law: A History of Legal Specialization, 45 S.C. L.
REV. 1003, 1006-09 (1993) (discussing a tenet of lawyer independence as one of “two
justifications of the idea of law as a profession”).
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fidences was limited in a number of respects. Relatedly, the Commission did not object to the imposition of a duty on a lawyer to disclose
“facts when necessary to correct an earlier misapprehension resulting
from the attorney’s action or ‘when required to disclose by law or the
rules of professional conduct.’ ”103
After eighteen months of meetings, Commission members were
asked what its work told the public. Two answers were, “An authoritative statement that lawyers are responsible to demands beyond
those of their immediate clients’; [and] ‘regulation of a private profession in the public interest.’ ”104
This discussion continued, with the members concluding that the
traditional phrase “officer of the court” meant that a lawyer was
“something more than a paid partisan, something more than a mouthpiece, but how much more?”105 The Commission subsequently noted
the related problem of the word “zealous.” “ ‘Zealous,’ it seems, has
curiously come to mean ‘overzealous,’ [and s]trong sentiment was
found around the table for dropping ‘zeal’ altogether as a descriptive
term with ethical consequences. It carries with it simply too much
baggage.”106
The extent to which the Commission’s proposed rules would affect
lawyer behavior unsettled some members. This concern arose when
the Commission discussed whether the proposed rules would require a
lawyer to warn the client that any perjury committed by the client
would be disclosed to the court. As noted by Dan Reynolds, who wrote
the Journals, “An underlying uneasiness was also voiced, again, that
there is a subtle, or perhaps not so subtle, shift here away from traditional concepts of advocacy toward a concept emphasizing the lawyer’s
status as officer of the court—a shift requiring the consideration of the
full Commission.”107 The Commission tentatively decided at its April
1979 meeting that an attorney possessed a duty to reveal perjury to
the tribunal and needed to warn a client of the consequences of engaging in perjury.108
At several 1979 meetings, the issue of requiring pro bono work
was raised.109 Some members noted the “enormous enforcement
103. JOURNALS, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA, DECEMBER 14-16, 1978, at 6.
104. JOURNALS, RESEARCH TRIANGLE, NORTH CAROLINA, FEBRUARY 23-24, 1979, at
12.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 19-20.
107. JOURNALS, OMAHA, NEBRASKA, JUNE 9-10, 1978, at 19.
108. JOURNALS, ATLANTA, GEORGIA, APRIL 7-8, 1978, at 29.
109. The Committee discussed this issue at its February, April, and June, 1979
meetings. See JOURNALS, RESEARCH TRIANGLE, NORTH CAROLINA, FEBRUARY 23-24, 1979,
at 24; JOURNALS, ATLANTA, GEORGIA, APRIL 7-8, 1978, at 13; JOURNALS, SEATTLE, WASHINGTON, JUNE 29-30, 1979, at 7.
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problems” that might exist, and that such a requirement would bear
heavily on “economically marginal practitioners,” but the Commission
encouraged continued thought on the subject.110 The Commission
later “felt [it] necessary to create some mechanism for more fairly distributing the burden of pro bono representation throughout the
bar.”111 Finally, at its June meeting, Commission members first evaluated proposed Rule 9.1, titled Pro Bono Practice. Some members
strongly approved of a mandatory pro bono requirement “to breathe
life into an otherwise high-minded but accusedly ineffective generalized statement of duty,” but most “were disinclined to follow the draft
approach,” and no decision was reached.112 When the working draft
was released in August, it included the requirement, “A lawyer shall
give forty hours per year to such service, or the equivalent thereof.”113
C. WORKING DRAFT/DISCUSSION DRAFT
1.

Working Draft

As promised,114 the Kutak Commission issued a “Working Draft”
to a select group for discussion at the ABA Annual Meeting in August
1979. Kutak attempted to temper expectations and criticisms of the
working draft when he told reporters that it had “never been voted on
by the committee and, in fact, has portions with which a majority disagree.”115 Even so, several critics registered strong negative reactions
to the working draft. Professor Phillip Schuchman declared, “The
commission has failed entirely.”116 The Commission was attacked
both for the limited nature of the release117 and the proposal’s substance. Professor Monroe Freedman also called the working draft “a
failure,”118 as well as “radical and radically wrong.”119 The American
110. JOURNALS, RESEARCH TRIANGLE, NORTH CAROLINA, FEBRUARY 23-24, 1979, at
24.
111. JOURNALS, ATLANTA, GEORGIA, APRIL 7-8, 1978, at 13.
112. JOURNALS, SEATTLE, WASHINGTON, JUNE 29-30, 1979, at 7.
113. See The Record: Text of Initial Draft of Ethics Code Rewrite Committee, LEGAL
TIMES, Aug. 27, 1979, at 26, 45 (publishing working draft, including Rule 9.1 Service to
pro bono publico).
114. See Commission Bites Bullet on Ethics Code Issues, 65 A.B.A. J. 887, 888 (1979)
(reporting the debate on the Kutak Commission’s working draft would take place at the
Annual Meeting).
115. Jonathan M. Winer, Ethics Draft Ignites Uproar, NAT’L L.J., Aug. 27, 1979, at
1.
116. Id. at 12.
117. See The Ethics of Secrecy, NAT’L L.J., Sept. 3, 1979, at 16 (suggesting the Commission’s limited release demonstrated a lack of transparency).
118. Laura Kiernan, ABA Keeps Ethics Code Under Wraps in Dallas, WASH. POST,
Aug. 12, 1979, 1979 WLNR 292925.
119. Winer, supra note 115, at 1.
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Trial Lawyers Association (“ATLA”) resolved to draft its own, competing ethics code.120 ATLA chose Freedman to serve as its Reporter.121
ATLA and Freedman were particularly concerned with the Commission’s decisions concerning the limits of the lawyer’s duty of confidentiality. As the Commission’s Journals made clear, one major goal
of the Model Rules was to leave behind the Code’s “basic posture of
‘my client, first, last and always.’ ”122 The result was an apparent emphasis on the limits of a lawyer’s duty to a client rather than the extent of such duty. For example, despite the Commission’s objection to
the word “zeal,” Rule 1.4 of the Working Draft was titled “Representing client with zeal.”123 Yet, after declaring in Rule 1.4(a) that the
lawyer “shall act with vigor and persistence in representing a client,”124 Rule 1.4 continued in subsequent sections and subsections to
note the conditions when a lawyer “may decline to pursue a course of
action on behalf of a client that the lawyer considers unjust although
in conformity with law.”125 Rule 1.5 created two occasions when a
“lawyer shall disclose information about a client.”126 A First Alternative added a third provision in which a lawyer was required to disclose
a client confidence,127 and a Second Alternative added two circumstances in which a lawyer was permitted, though not required, to disclose a client confidence.128
Further, in Working Draft Rule 3.2(a)(4):
120. Trial Lawyers Group Parts Company with ABA on Ethics Code, 65 A.B.A. J.
1299, 1299 (1979) (reporting ATLA planned to write code “independent of the ABA Code
of Professional Responsibility”); Winer, supra note 115, at 1 (noting ATLA’s response to
working draft). ATLA is now known as the American Association for Justice.
121. ATLA’s Discussion Draft was published in mid-1980, see Commission on Professional Responsibility of the Roscoe Pound-American Trial Lawyer’s Foundation, The
American Lawyer’s Code of Conduct Discussion Draft-June 1980, TRIAL, Aug. 1980, at
44 [hereinafter “Code of Conduct”]. A revised draft was published in mid-1982, and was
again critical of the Kutak Commission’s approach. See Commission on Professional Responsibility of the Roscoe Pound-American Trial Lawyers Association, The American
Lawyer’s Code of Conduct, TRIAL, July 1982, at 55.
122. JOURNALS, SEATTLE, WASHINGTON, JUNE 29-30, 1979, at 16 (quoting Reporter
Geoffrey Hazard).
123. See The Record, supra note 113, at 28. The Working Draft was leaked after the
uproar at the Annual Meeting, and published in both Legal Times, a weekly law newspaper in Washington, D.C., and in the Daily Report for Executives, see Mark H. Aultman, Legal Fiction Becomes Legal Fantasy, 7. J. LEGAL PROF. 31, 39 (1982).
124. See The Record, supra note 113, at 28.
125. Id.
126. See id. At its August 1979 meeting after the debate, the Commission concluded
that “mandatory disclosure of acts amounting to fraud was inappropriate and that such
disclosure should be permitted though not actually compelled in all cases and circumstances.” JOURNALS, ASPEN, COLORADO, AUGUST 25-27, 1978, at 23-24.
127. The Record, supra note 113, at 28-29. This third instance in which a lawyer
possessed a duty of disclosure was to “prevent or rectify the consequences of a deliberately wrongful act by the client in which the lawyer’s services are or were involved.”
128. Id. at 29.

708

CREIGHTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 49

if a lawyer discovers that evi[d]ence or testimony that the
lawyer has presented is false or fabricated, it is the lawyer’s
duty to disclose that fact and to take suitable measures to
rectify the consequences, even if doing so requires disclosure
of a confidence of the client or disclosure that the client is
implicated in the falsification or fabrication.129
This was the Commission’s resolution of the lawyer’s duty when the
lawyer knew a client committed perjury. In Freedman’s view, this
rule would require lawyers to give clients a “kind of Miranda warning
at the outset of their relationship.”130
Rule 1.8 was titled “Representation of an unpopular or indigent
client.” The Rule gave lawyers substantial discretion in choosing
which clients to represent. However, the commentary admonished
lawyers that “important qualifications [exist] on a lawyer’s freedom in
selecting clients.”131 Finally, Rule 9.1 made pro bono work
mandatory.132
The Kutak Commission met again at the end of August 1979. It
responded optimistically to criticism: “the heightened level of debate
over the issues facing the group was a positive, if unexpected, turn of
events.”133 The Commission lessened the occasions requiring disclosure of client confidences,134 and continued to debate any requirement
of mandatory pro bono. On the final day of its August meeting, the
Commission agreed to a modified rule regarding pro bono service.
This modified rule broadly defined pro bono, included a reporting requirement in lieu of a minimum hours measurement, and permitted a
lawyer to meet the rule through a “buy-out” provision.135
At the Commission’s final meeting, avoiding the word “zeal” led to
an effort to avoid its substitute, “vigor.”136 The Commission found

129. Id. at 36.
130. See Revised Ethics Code, supra note 82, at 1283 (quoting Freedman).
131. The Record, supra note 113, at 31.
132. Id. at 45. One unidentified source told the National Law Journal that this
provision had been rejected in the only informal vote the Commission had taken. See
Winer, supra note 115, at 12.
133. JOURNALS, SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH, AUGUST 24-26, 1979, at 1.
134. The Commission concluded that “mandatory disclosure of acts amounting to
fraud was inappropriate and that such disclosure should be permitted though not actually compelled in all cases and circumstances.” JOURNALS, ASPEN, COLORADO, AUGUST
25-27, 1978, at 23-24.
135. JOURNALS, SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH, AUGUST 24-26, 1979, at 30-31.
136. See The Record, supra note 113, at 28 (stating in Rule 1.4(a) “A lawyer shall act
with vigor and persistence in representing a client”). At its April 1979 meeting, the
Journal noted, “The search for a less expansive concept than zealotry goes on.” JOURNALS, CHICAGO, ILLINOIS, APRIL 27-28, 1979, at 11.
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“similar kinds of difficulties with the connotational baggage.”137 It replaced “vigor” and “vigorous” with “diligent.”138
2.

Discussion Draft

The Discussion Draft was officially released on January 30, 1980.
Critics attacked. The title of one article suggested the passion of those
critical of the Kutak Commission’s work: “ABA Ethics Revision Criticized: Could Destroy Judicial System.”139 The Wall Street Journal titled an editorial on the Discussion Draft, “A License to Squeal?”140
The Discussion Draft reaffirmed the Kutak Commission’s view
that “lawyers are responsible to demands beyond those of their immediate clients.”141 Some of the most controversial positions in the
Working Draft were modified, but its general policies remained in
place. For example, a lawyer was required to disclose a client confidence to prevent the death of, or serious bodily harm to, another.142
The Commission amended but retained the rule that a lawyer was forbidden to “offer evidence that the lawyer is convinced beyond a reasonable doubt is false.”143 It also kept the requirement that a “lawyer
shall render unpaid public interest legal service.”144 Rule 1.7(c)(2)
permitted a lawyer to disclose harms beyond crimes, which was
broader than allowed in the Code. Rule 4.2, which limited the duty of
client loyalty in negotiations in favor of a duty of candor to others, was
expanded between the Working Draft and Discussion Draft. First, it
was titled “Candor toward other parties” in the Working Draft,145 and
broadened to “Fairness to Other Participants” in the Discussion Draft.
Second, the Discussion Draft expanded the occasions in which the lawyer’s duty of client loyalty was limited.146 The Discussion Draft did
add an exception to the candor requirement not found in the Working
137. JOURNALS, NEW ORLEANS, LOUISIANA, OCTOBER 26-27, 1979, at 15.
138. Id.
139. ABA Ethics Revision Criticized: Could Destroy Judicial System, DAILY REC.,
Jan. 17, 1980, at 6. The article extensively quoted Theodore Koskoff, President of
ATLA.
140. Editorial, A License to Squeal?, WALL ST. J., Feb. 11, 1980, at 20; see also Editorial, The Proposed New Code, NAT’L L.J., Feb. 25, 1980, at 16 (noting “proposals are
likely to generate controversy and heated debate within the legal profession.”).
141. JOURNALS, RESEARCH TRIANGLE, NORTH CAROLINA, FEBRUARY 23-24, 1979, at
12.
142. DISCUSSION DRAFT, supra note 86, r. 1.7(b).
143. DISCUSSION DRAFT, supra note 86, r. 3.1(a)(3).
144. DISCUSSION DRAFT, supra note 86, r. 8.1.
145. The Record, supra note 113, at 40.
146. Compare id. at 40 (listing occasions when lawyer shall be candid with other
parties), with DISCUSSION DRAFT, supra note 86, r. 4.2 (adding additional instances in
which was lawyer’s behavior to another was constrained).
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Draft: A criminal defense attorney was not required to correct another’s misapprehension if the accused created that misapprehension.
The Preface to the Kutak Commission’s January 1980 Discussion
Draft forthrightly states, “the Commission soon realized that more
than a series of amendments or a general restatement of the Model
Code of Professional Responsibility was in order. The Commission determined that a comprehensive reformulation was required.”147
When the National Organization of Bar Counsel (“NOBC”) issued its
August 1980 Report and Recommendations attacking much of the Discussion Draft,148 it quoted and criticized that language. Unfortunately, the NOBC misread “reformulation,” as “reformation.”149 The
NOBC’s mistake is understandable. The Kutak Commission intended
a reformation. It perceived its mission as reforming a lagging, possibly ossified and self-interested—if not corrupt—institution. Part of its
mission was to “promulgate statements of ethics it believes to be correct but which may not meet with the general approval of the Bar.”150
And teaching lawyers to attend to a “determinable public interest”151
was a prominent theme of the Discussion Draft.
3.

Reaction

The Kutak Commission invited reaction to its Discussion Draft.
It may have underestimated interest in its proposal. The cover letter
inviting comments stated, “We plan to submit a final version of the
Rules to the House of Delegates at its February, 1981 meeting.”152
The Discussion Draft produced an “enormous response.”153 The
written comments received throughout 1980 were compiled by Reporter Geoffrey Hazard and organized in four volumes.154 Both bar
organizations and individuals commented, with widely disparate
views and interests.
147. DISCUSSION DRAFT, supra note 86, preface.
148. National Organization of Bar Counsel, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS ON
STUDY OF THE MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (DISCUSSION DRAFT OF JANUARY
30, 1980) at 2 (1980) [hereinafter “REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS”].
149. Id. at 2.
150. JOURNALS, NEW YORK CITY, NEW YORK, DECEMBER 16-17, 1977, at 16.
151. Id.
152. DISCUSSION DRAFT, supra note 86, Cover Letter.
153. PROPOSED FINAL DRAFT, supra note 82, Chairman’s Introduction.
154. See COMPILATION OF COMMENTS ON MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (4
vols., Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., comp. 1980) (on file with author) [hereinafter “COMPILATION”]. The first two volumes were dated June 11, 1980, and the second two volumes
dated September 30, 1980. In each case institutional responses comprised the initial
volume and individual responses the second volume. In the first two volumes and volume 4, the second set of individual comments, the comments are organized by Rule. In
volume 3, the institutional comments are listed in alphabetical order.
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The ABA Standing Committee on Legal Aid and Indigent Defendants made a comment that may encapsulate the overarching view of
all commentators: “The Model Rules depart from the approach taken
in earlier efforts to define the ethical basis for lawyers’ actions. The
draft represents a comprehensive and far reaching effort to revise
both the conceptual framework and much of the content by which the
profession is to regulate its conduct.”155 Although complimentary of
the Commission’s work, this ABA Standing Committee rejected the
Commission’s departure from the traditional conceptual framework
and substantive content of the Code. The Commission’s rules, if not
modified, “are likely to have a substantial adverse impact on the nature of the attorney-client relationship and on the ability to provide
clients with effective assistance of counsel.”156
Many other commenters agreed, and the overall reaction to the
Commission’s re-orientation from the Code’s “basic posture” was negative.157 The Report of the Special Committee of the New Jersey State
Bar Association concluded the Preamble to the Discussion Draft
“marks a significant departure from the traditional concept that the
‘duty of the lawyer to his client and his duty to the legal system are
the same.’ ”158 It continued, noting that the Rules properly accounted
for the fact that the “lawyer need not act as a ‘mouthpiece’ or as a
‘hired gun.’ ”159 But the Draft failed to “achieve an appropriate balance between the need to re-define the traditional role of the lawyer
and the need to preserve the lawyer-client relationship.”160 The Los
Angeles County Bar Association registered its “difficulty with the concept of the lawyer as a protector of the public interest, especially at the
expense of client confidences.”161
A comment from an individual lawyer put this criticism more passionately. Adoption of the proposed rules would cause “not only chaos
but a total obliteration of the traditional adversary system . . . . They
would totally destroy the very basis of American freedom.”162
Many critical comments were made concerning the lawyer’s duty
of loyalty to a client. Volume 2 of the Compilation included a number
of comments regarding Rule 1.7(b), which required disclosure of a client confidence to prevent another’s death or serious injury. Most sug155. See 3 COMPILATION O-40, at 2 (reprinting position of ABA Standing Committee
on Legal Aid and Indigent Defendants).
156. Id. at 26-27.
157. This might be an expected outcome, for those who concluded the Commission
got it right would lack the same incentive to comment.
158. 1 COMPILATION GENERAL COMMENTS, at 8.
159. Id. at 10.
160. Id. at 11.
161. 3 COMPILATION O-47, at ii.
162. 4 COMPILATION GENERAL COMMENTS, at 2.
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gested amending the proposal, sometimes to relax the rule, but
occasionally to reinforce it.163 Only a few individuals commented on
the duty to disclose perjury, one of whom concluded that perjury
should not be countenanced at all.164 In the second set of comments
by individuals on Rule 1.7, the tone was more passionate and critical.
One lawyer wrote:
At the risk of sounding melodramatic, it is with great sadness
that I contemplate a future where, as an attorney, I must
read a prospective client a statement similar to that read by
an arresting police officer. However, if Section 1.7 is adopted
in its present form and is interpreted in the manner most
likely, attorneys will have to advise prospective clients that
anything they say may be used against them.165
Institutional concerns were less emotional but often just as critical. For example, the ABA Section on Criminal Justice Committee on
Ethical Considerations in the Prosecution and Defense of Criminal
Cases offered a lengthy letter, including appendices, which proposed a
number of amendments, including eliminating any mandatory disclosure of client confidences.166 The Banking, Corporation and Business
Law Section of the New York State Bar Association rejected Rule
1.7(b) because of “our belief in the paramount importance of the confidentiality between lawyer and client as one of the pillars of our system
of justice.”167 The Committee on Professional and Judicial Ethics of
the ABCNY issued a preliminary report criticizing the Discussion
Draft because the “Model Rules appear to be predicated upon a perceived conflict between the lawyer’s role as confidant and zealous representative of the client and the lawyer’s duties to society. As a
consequence, a number of the Rules mandate disclosure of client confidences.”168 Another committee of the ABCNY, the Committee on Cor163. 2 COMPILATION RULE 1.7, at 1-18.
164. 2 COMPILATION RULE 3.1, at 5.
165. See 4 COMPILATION RULE 1.7, at 2; accord 4 COMPILATION RULE 3.1, at 2 (“I am
not a criminal lawyer, but the proposed rule requiring disclosure of clients’ ‘perjury’ is
objectionable. The attorney thus becomes the jury.”).
166. See 3 COMPILATION O-35, at 2-3.
167. See 3 COMPILATION O-53, at 11. This view was recommended in August 1980 by
a Special Committee of the New York State Bar Association. See Report of the Special
Committee to Review ABA Draft Model Rules of Professional Conduct, NEW YORK STATE
BAR ASSOCIATION 22 (1981) [hereinafter “New York State Bar”] (rejecting mandatory
disclosures in Rules 1.7(b), 3.1(d), 4.2(b) and 6.2(c) (Appendix A)).
168. See Committee on Professional and Judicial Ethics, Preliminary Report on the
ABA Proposed Model Rules of Professional Conduct (January 30, 1980 Draft), ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK 7 (1980) [hereinafter “Judicial Ethics”]. The
Committee suggested eliminating any mandatory disclosures in Rule 1.7(b), see id. at
16, and rejected the view in Rule 3.1 that required disclosure of false testimony by the
criminally accused. See id. at 37. Accord 3 COMPILATION O-52, at 14 (rejecting duty of
disclosure of false testimony by client in favor of allowing client to make unquestioned
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porate Law Departments, concluded, “The Model Rules propose a
fundamental and undesirable change in the role of the lawyer, mandating disclosure, or expanding the scope of disclosure, of client confidences to an extent that the Committee believes to be unwise.”169 It
specifically urged eliminating any mandatory disclosures in Rule
1.7(b).170 The Committee on Legal Ethics and Discipline of the American College of Trial Lawyers (“ACTL”) determined Rule 1.7 “would
drastically change a client’s right to assume that confidential information will not be revealed by his attorney.”171 The Legal Aid Society of
New York concurred: “Taken as a whole, these provisions appear to
reflect a shift away from the traditional view of a lawyer’s role as confidant and zealous representative of the client.”172
On the other hand, some initial institutional comments supported
Rule 1.7(b)’s requirement of mandatory disclosure to prevent death or
serious bodily harm to another. The ABCNY’s Committee on Professional Responsibility agreed with the Kutak Commission and thus disagreed with other ABCNY committees.173 A majority of the
Committee on Legal Aid of the New York State Bar Association
“agree[d] that a lawyer should disclose information about a client
when it appears necessary to prevent the client from committing an
act that would result in death or serious bodily harm to another person.”174 The Special Committee of the New Jersey State Bar Association found that the “intent and purpose of the Rule [1.7(b)] is
appropriate and acceptable,”175 though it concluded the language of
the Rule was dangerously ambiguous.
In sum, the reaction of bar associations to the Commission’s policy
requiring disclosure of a client confidence to prevent death or serious
bodily harm to another was in some disarray. And those committees
were often internally divided.176
statement); see also 3 COMPILATION O-42, at 6 (noting rejection by American College of
Probate Counsel of mandatory disclosure requirement in Rule 1.7).
169. See Committee on Corporate Law Departments, Preliminary Report on the
ABA Proposed Model Rules of Professional Conduct (January 30, 1980 Draft), ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK 68 (1980) [hereinafter “Corporate Law”].
170. See id. at 71.
171. 3 COMPILATION O-43, at 16. It also suggested modifying Rule 3.1(f) to allow a
lawyer to offer false evidence when it was lawfully demanded by the client and the
lawyer was not permitted to withdraw. See id. at 39.
172. 1 COMPILATION RULE 1.7, at 7.
173. See Committee on Professional Responsibility, Preliminary Report on the ABA
Proposed Model Rules of Professional Conduct (January 30, 1980 Draft), ASSOCIATION
OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, at 77-78.
174. 1 COMPILATION RULE 1.7, at 7.
175. 1 COMPILATION RULE 1.7, at 9.
176. See, e.g., Separate Statement of Stephen Gillers, Committee on Professional
and Judicial Ethics, Preliminary Report, ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW
YORK at 49, 51 (stating agreement with Kutak Commission on Rule 1.7 and other rules

714

CREIGHTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 49

Rule 3.1 addressed a related issue: the lawyer’s duty to disclose a
client’s false testimony or that the lawyer had unknowingly offered
false evidence. It was also the subject of divided bar association comment.177 The New Jersey Special Committee believed a “lawyer
should not be required to offer the perjured testimony or false evidence of his client.”178 The ethics Committee of the ACTL agreed: “We
object to subsection (f) insofar as it would require an attorney to offer
evidence which he knows to be false.”179 The ethics Committee of the
ABCNY disagreed: “The Committee does not agree with the drafters’
assumption that disclosure is desirable in a criminal case.”180 The
ABA Standing Committee on Legal Aid and Indigent Defendants also
rejected the proposed rule: “The Model Rules would better serve the
bar and the public if the Rules recognized explicitly that it is an ethical obligation of the lawyer to protect and safeguard clients’ constitutional rights.”181
Rule 4.2 was another rule that appeared to promote a generalized
fairness above client loyalty. It was titled Fairness to Other Participants, and applied to the ethics of negotiation. It began, “In conducting negotiations a lawyer shall be fair in dealing with other
participants.” Subsections (b) and (c) indicated the ethical limits of
negotiating for a client. Both subsections were written in mandatory
“shall not” language. This mandatory language meant a lawyer was
subject to discipline if he violated the provision. Discussion Draft
Rule 4.2(b)(2) created an affirmative duty to others “to correct a manifest misapprehension of fact or law resulting from a previous representation made by the lawyer or known by the lawyer to have been
made by the client” in any matter other than when representing the
criminally accused. The ABCNY’s Committee on Professional and Judicial Ethics objected to Rule 4.2(b), asserting “the incompatibility of
the Rule with the adversary system.”182 It called the rule “a fundamental departure from the adversary system.”183 The ABCNY’s Comthat “seek to reduced adversity, however, modestly, in favor of truth” contrary to view of
Committee).
177. See 1 COMPILATION RULE 3.1, at 1-21.
178. See id. at 4.
179. 3 COMPILATION O-43, at 37.
180. Judicial Ethics, supra note 168, at 37; see also 1 COMPILATION RULE 3.1, at 8
(reporting view of Indiana State Bar Association, which itself delegated review to its
Criminal Justice Section, that Rule 3.1(b) was “incomplete and unacceptable”).
181. 3 COMPILATION O-40, at 31. The National Legal Aid and Defender Association
urged the Commission to substitute proposed Standard 4-7.7 of the ABA Standards Related to the Defense Function (1978 ed.), which did not allow the lawyer to disclose
client perjury. See also 3 COMPILATION O-52, at 14.
182. Judicial Ethics, supra note 168, at 41.
183. Id. In a separate statement, Committee member Stephen Gillers noted his disagreement. See id. at 51.
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mittee on Corporate Law Departments agreed: “These proposals are
objectionable . . . because of ambiguity as to what may be considered
fair, unfair, illegal or unconscionable and also because of an inconsistency with the attorney-client relationship.”184 Others also attacked
the rule as “seriously objectionable,”185 for it “would require the lawyer to take a position contrary to the client, and in some cases to disclose confidential information. These are not the purposes of an
adversary system.”186 The ABA Standing Committee on Ethics and
Professional Responsibility urged Rule 4.2 be abandoned.187
Individual comments on the mandatory pro bono requirement,
Rule 8.1, were almost always negative.188 Although most lawyers
agreed pro bono service should be encouraged, they argued such service should be voluntary rather than mandatory.189 The American
College of Probate Counsel concluded the mandatory pro bono requirement was “objectionable in its reporting requirements and there was
some belief that there might be a problem of conflicts of interest if the
lawyer were reporting pro bono services to a public agency.”190 The
Los Angeles County Bar Association recommended lawyers perform
pro bono service, but also concluded such service should be voluntary.191 The National Legal Aid and Defenders Association disagreed,
commending “this Commission for its courage to recommend
mandatory pro bono services.”192 Even so, it could not support the
proposal as written because the definition of such services was too
broad.193
Two institutions went beyond commenting on the Discussion
Draft and offered codes to compete with the Model Rules: ATLA and
the NOBC. As promised in its response to the Working Draft, ATLA
issued in June 1980 a Public Discussion Draft of The American Lawyer’s Code of Conduct.194 Its Reporter, Monroe Freedman, had heavily
criticized the Working Draft of the Model Rules, particularly its exceptions to the lawyer’s duty to keep a client’s confidences. The Code of
Conduct kept a Restatement-like style, offering black-letter rules with
accompanying commentary and illustrative cases. The Code of Con184.
185.
186.
187.
Code).
188.
189.
8.1, at
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.

Corporate Law, supra note 169, at 72.
2 COMPILATION RULE 4.2, at 1.
3 COMPILATION O-47, at 10.
3 COMPILATION O-39, at 13 (re-writing rule which returned to framework of
See 2 COMPILATION RULE 8.1, at 1-10; see also 4 COMPILATION RULE 8.1, at 1-17.
See 2 COMPILATION RULE 8.1, at 1-10; 4 COMPILATION RULE 8, at 1-5, and RULE
1-10.
See 3 COMPILATION O-42, at 13.
3 COMPILATION O-47, at 13.
3 COMPILATION O-52, at 2.
Id. at 2-3.
Code of Conduct, supra note 121, at 44 et seq.
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duct took a very different substantive approach to the idea of the lawyer as more than hired gun or mouthpiece. The Preamble of the Code
of Conduct clearly indicated the perspective from which its rules were
written: “The lawyer serves that most basic individual right, that of
personal autonomy—the right to make those decisions that most affect one’s own life and values.”195 Because the lawyer served the client, the emphasis of the Code of Conduct was to foster client
autonomy. The Code of Conduct never required a lawyer to disclose a
client confidence. It offered two Alternatives concerning the occasions
when a lawyer possessed the discretion to disclose a confidence. Alternative B gave the lawyer such discretion in just two circumstances: 1)
when “required to do so by law”; and 2) “to the extent necessary to
defend against formally instituted charges of criminal conduct, malpractice, or disciplinary violation brought against the lawyer.”196 Alternative A was a bit broader, allowing the lawyer to disclose a client
confidence when, in a pending case, the lawyer knew a judge or juror
had been bribed or extorted,197 and “when the lawyer reasonably believe[d] that divulgence [wa]s necessary to prevent imminent danger
to human life.”198 The Comment to this section acknowledged that
both Alternatives “[we]re more protective of confidentiality than are
the Code of Professional Responsibility or the ABA’s Model Rules.”199
A number of Illustrative Cases that followed the Comment indicated
the extent to which this Code protected client autonomy. Freedman
stated a lawyer committed a disciplinary violation in revealing the client’s perjury in a civil deposition, as well as in having the criminal
defendant give a narrative statement during direct examination when
his lawyer knew he was giving false testimony.200 In any civil or criminal case, if a client informed a lawyer that he planned to testify
falsely, it was the lawyer’s duty, when withdrawal was unavailable, to
“present[ ] the client’s testimony in the ordinary manner, and refer[ ]
to it in summation as evidence in the case.”201 The Illustrative Cases
went further, using People v. Belge. First, the Code of Conduct vindicated the actions of Robert Garrow’s attorneys, who did not disclose
the locations of the bodies of his murder victims until after Garrow
testified at his trial for another murder. Second, it held that disclosing the location of the remains to the victims’ parents was a disciplinary violation, implicitly because this disclosure could or would be
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 48.
at 50.

at 51.
at 52.
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traced from the lawyer back to the client and place the client in further criminal jeopardy. Third, if the lawyer found the female victim
alive but seriously injured “and unable to help herself or to get help,”
and anonymously called an ambulance to help save her life, no violation existed under Alternative A.202 By implication, of course, this action would be a disciplinary violation under Alternative B. The lawyer
would also apparently commit a disciplinary violation when he called
authorities anonymously if the seriously injured victim was able to
help herself, for even an anonymous landline call (this being 1980)
might be traceable back to the lawyer, and through him, to his client.
The NOBC took the opposite tack, both structurally and substantively. As a structural matter, the NOBC objected to the Kutak Commission’s decision to scrap the format of the Code in favor of a
Restatement-like approach.203 It declared that a change in the format
“would seriously impair the acceptability and effectiveness of a Model
Code.”204 Its proposal amended the Code, using material from the
Discussion Draft to aid its work. Substantively, the NOBC rejected
ATLA’s libertarian model. It urged the Kutak Commission to make
lawyers even more responsible to the demands of the public. For example, it accepted the mandatory disclosure requirement of Discussion Draft Rule 1.7(b),205 but wanted to retain the provision in the
Code allowing a lawyer to disclose the “intention of his client to commit a crime,” which the Rules had eliminated.206 Additionally, the
NOBC kept the more specific Code rule, DR 7-102(A)(4), which stated
that a lawyer shall not “[k]nowingly use perjured testimony or false
evidence.”207 The NOBC also rejected Discussion Draft Rule 3.1(f)(3),
which required a criminal defense lawyer to offer “evidence regardless
of belief as to whether it is false if the client so demands and applicable law requires that the lawyer comply with such a demand.”208 It
rejected Discussion Draft Rule 4.2 requiring a lawyer in negotiations
to “be fair in dealing with other participants,” not because it rejected a
duty of fairness, but because the rule “has left out the requirement of
courtesy.”209 Finally, it rejected the mandatory pro bono rule due to
the “extremely burdensome” enforcement problems of any rule mandating pro bono service, as well as the absence of any standard by
202. Id.
203. REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 148, at 2, 99.
204. Id. at 2.
205. “The Kutak Commission recognized the needed exception where a client intends to commit an act resulting in death or serious bodily harm.” Id. at 33.
206. Id. at 33, 76.
207. See id. at 51, 56.
208. DISCUSSION DRAFT, supra note 86, r. 3.1(f)(3).
209. REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 148, at 91.
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which enforcement authorities could determine whether the rule had
been violated.210
On October 2, 1980, at Robert Kutak’s request, ABA President
William Reece Smith decided, “as a result of extensive criticism of the
proposed Model Rules,” to extend consideration of the proposed Rules
for a year.211 This delayed the ABA House of Delegates’ consideration
of the rules to its annual meeting in August 1982.212
4.

Proposed Final Draft

Kutak wrote a lengthy introduction to the May 1981 Proposed Final Draft of the Model Rules. He reaffirmed and defended the Commission’s decision to use a Restatement approach.213 The reasons for
doing so included convenience “to the average practitioner,”214 and
“substantive considerations as well.”215 The Code too often used Ethical Considerations as commentary on Disciplinary Rules.216 Of
“greater concern” was the fact that “many Ethical Considerations . . .
may be viewed as incorporating obligations under law beyond the
Code.”217 Overstating the case, Kutak concluded, “The law of professional responsibility is as balkanized now as it was under the 1908
Canons.”218
Kutak acknowledged the influence of the Discussion Draft comments on the Commission’s substantive work. He noted the pro bono
210. Id. at 94.
211. See Section Council Opposes Kutak Model Rules, LITIG. NEWS, Jan. 1981, at 1.
In a letter dated October 9, 1980, Kutak stated, “I have proposed to Reece Smith that
our timetable be extended one year.” See Letter from Robert J. Kutak to Dear Colleagues (Oct. 9, 1980) (on file with author).
212. Id.
213. The House of Delegates approved the Restatement approach at its 1982 Midyear Meeting. See The Midyear Meeting - House of Delegates, 107 A.B.A. ANN. REP. 273,
301 (1982). In a letter, Kutak listed the bar organizations that supported and opposed
the Restatement format. He listed eight that explicitly supported it, eight that supported it but filed no statement explicitly saying so to the ABA, and 17 opposed. See
Letter from of Robert J. Kutak to Dear Colleagues, at 1-2 (Nov. 25, 1981) (on file with
author).
214. PROPOSED FINAL DRAFT, supra note 82, Chairman’s Introduction.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id. This explanation did not satisfy the Special Committee to Review ABA
Draft Model Rules of Professional Conduct of the New York State Bar Association. See
New York State Bar, supra note 167, at 5 (noting “decision to adopt the Restatement
format is remarkable in light of the fact that the ALI authors of the various Restatements have emphatically expressed their view that the Restatement format is inappropriate to the adoption of codes intended to have the force of law.”); see also id. at 6-7
(rejecting reasons of convenience and uncertain standards as illusory benefits).
218. PROPOSED FINAL DRAFT, supra note 82, Chairman’s Introduction. To placate
critics, he noted that the Commission was concurrently publishing “a companion document couched as nearly as possible in the format of the current Code.” Id.
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requirement had been removed,219 and that the rule regarding client
confidences (renumbered from Rule 1.7 to 1.6 in the Proposed Final
Draft), “both broadens the general rule of confidentiality and narrows
its exceptions.”220 Rule 1.6(b)(2) gave the lawyer discretion to disclose
a client confidence the lawyer believed “is likely to result in death or
substantial bodily harm.”221 The Commission may have attempted to
ameliorate this change by adding language allowing a lawyer to disclose a client confidence to prevent “substantial injury to the financial
interest or property of another.”222 Making life and property
equivalent was pouring salt into the wound for those, such as the
NOBC, supportive of the mandatory Discussion Draft rule.
Kutak did not discuss the changes made to rules concerning the
duty of the lawyer to third persons in negotiations. The words “fair”
and “fairness” disappeared from Proposed Final Draft Rule 4.1 and its
commentary (renumbered from 4.2 in the Discussion Draft). Instead,
Rule 4.1 created a legalistic standard. The Comment to Proposed Final Draft Rule 4.1(b) provided examples in which a lawyer knowingly
failed to “disclose a fact to a third person.”223 Each of the four examples suggested that the failure to disclose exposed the lawyer to civil
or criminal liability. In this light, Rule 4.1(b) appeared designed more
to protect the lawyer of a devious client than the interests of a third
person. Rule 4.4, Respect for Rights of Third Persons, made this
clearer. The lawyer was to avoid violating the legal rights of third
persons, from opposing counsel to witnesses to those from whom evidence might illegally be taken.224
Even when the Commission retained a controversial rule concerning the lawyer-client relationship, it modified its approach and language. Kutak explained the Commission’s decision to require lawyer
disclosure of “a client’s surprise perjury” as rooted in the “majority
view compelling such disclosure.”225 But, due to the “considerable uncertainty surrounding the proper constitutional standard,”226 the
Commission added to the Proposed Final Draft (now Rule 3.3) a “CAVEAT: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW DEFINING THE RIGHT OF AS219. Id. Kutak reported that Commission members Thomas Ehrlich and Jane
Frank-Harman “would be recorded as favoring our initial position.” Id. Rule 6.1 encouraged lawyers to “render public interest legal service,” but eliminated any duties
accompanying this encouragement. See PROPOSED FINAL DRAFT, supra note 82, r. 6.1.
220. Id.; see also PROPOSED FINAL DRAFT, supra note 82, r. 1.6 (couching all exceptions to the rule requiring the lawyer to keep client confidences in the permissive).
221. PROPOSED FINAL DRAFT, supra note 82, r. 1.6(b)(2).
222. Id.
223. See PROPOSED FINAL DRAFT, supra note 82, r. 4.1(b) cmt.
224. PROPOSED FINAL DRAFT, supra note 82, r. 4.4 cmt.
225. PROPOSED FINAL DRAFT, supra note 82, Chairman’s Introduction.
226. Id.
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SISTANCE OF COUNSEL IN CRIMINAL CASES MAY
SUPERSEDE THE OBLIGATIONS STATED IN THIS RULE.”227
The caveat was wholly unnecessary, for constitutional law mandates
always trump ordinary legislation. Creating a fully capitalized caveat
rather than adding a sentence or paragraph to the Comment was to
try to have it both ways: to maintain its position and to placate critics.228 The Comment on False or Fabricated Evidence in the Proposed
Final Draft was also softened. In the Discussion Draft, the Comment
concluded that “it is settled that an advocate must disclose the client’s
deception to the court or to the other party.”229 In the Proposed Final
Draft, the Comment was altered to “the rule generally recognized is
that, if necessary to rectify the situation,” the lawyer was bound to
disclose.230
Finally, Kutak noted, “Another major area of concern was the
lawyer’s role as advocate in an adversary system.”231 He defended the
Commission’s conclusions. After arguing “that a lawyer is a representative of a client but also an officer of the court,” and thus owes “a duty
of candor to the court and one of loyalty to the client,” a number of
questions remain: How should this conflict be resolved? What are the
lawyer’s duties to the court? What are the limits of duty to a client?
Does a client have a right to use illegal or wrongful means to gain his
objectives? Does a client have a right to the assistance of a lawyer in
the process?232
Framing his questions in this manner suggested the continuing
allure of creating a set of rules that embraced the view that “lawyers
are responsible to demands beyond those of their immediate clients.”233 All but the first of these five questions was biased in favor of
adopting limits on the duty of client loyalty. As posed, the questions
broadly called for an understanding of “a determinable public interest.”234 These questions were more difficult to answer because the
227. PROPOSED FINAL DRAFT, supra note 82, r. 3.3.
228. In the Comment to Perjury by a Criminal Defendant, the Proposed Final Draft
stated: “The most difficult situation, therefore, arises in a criminal case where the accused insists on testifying when the lawyer knows that the testimony is perjurious.”
PROPOSED FINAL DRAFT, supra note 82, r. 3.3 cmt. The Discussion Draft had used a
slightly less stringent test in its commentary: “The most difficult situation therefore
arises in a criminal case where the accused insists on testifying when it is plain to the
lawyer that the testimony will be perjurious.” DISCUSSION DRAFT, supra note 86, r. 3.1
cmt.
229. Id.
230. PROPOSED FINAL DRAFT, supra note 82, r. 3.3 cmt.
231. PROPOSED FINAL DRAFT, supra note 82, Chairman’s Introduction.
232. Id.
233. JOURNALS, RESEARCH TRIANGLE, NORTH CAROLINA, FEBRUARY 23-24, 1979, at
12.
234. JOURNALS, NEW YORK CITY, NEW YORK, DECEMBER 16-17, 1977, at 14.
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Proposed Final Draft had bent toward the Code’s “basic posture of ‘my
client, first, last and always.’ ”235 By mid-1981, the Commission was
attempting to hold on to whatever gains it had made in reminding
lawyers of their duty to the public as well as their clients.
IV. THE END OF OPTIMISM
A. DISCOVERY ABUSE
In 1976, the Judicial Conference of the United States Conference
of Chief Justices and the ABA held a National Conference on the
Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice.236 It was a celebration of and rumination on Roscoe Pound’s famous speech to the ABA in 1906,237 and known as the Pound
Conference. The opening speech by Chief Justice Warren Burger offered nine “areas of concern” about which “we must probe for fundamental changes and major overhaul rather than simply
‘tinkering.’”238 None involved remedying poor lawyer behavior.239
None of the other ten published speeches focused on bad lawyers.240
Excessive lawyer conduct was discussed briefly in just two essays.241
One of those essays did use the word “abuse” in discussing the work of
lawyers in pretrial discovery. Even then, the author specifically limited such abuse to complex civil cases.242 One author-judge later declared, “Abuse in the use of discovery was a major concern at the
Pound Conference,”243 but that was apparently only true in a small
number of cases.
235. JOURNALS, SEATTLE, WASHINGTON, JUNE 29-30, 1979, at 16 (quoting Reporter
Geoffrey Hazard).
236. See 70 F.R.D. 79 (1976). A discussion of the path from the Pound Conference to
the 1983 amendments is beyond the scope of this paper. For a skeptical view, see Richard L. Marcus, Discovery Containment Redux, 39 B.C. L. REV. 747 (1998).
237. See Roscoe Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice, 29 A.B.A. ANN. REP. 395 (1906).
238. Warren E. Burger, Agenda for 2000 A.D.—A Need for Systematic Anticipation,
70 F.R.D. 83, 93-95 (1976).
239. Burger mentioned the negative view of lawyers only in the context of the ability
of a “handful” to mar the reputation of the great majority. See id. at 92.
240. One essay lamented the obligation of the criminal defense attorney to “raise
every conceivable objection,” but viewed that approach as merely a way to inoculate the
lawyer from a later charge of malpractice. See Walter E. Schaefer, Is the Adversary
System Working in Optimal Fashion?, 70 F.R.D. 159, 170 (1976).
241. Francis R. Kirkham, Complex Civil Litigation—Have Good Intentions Gone
Awry?, 70 F.R.D. 199 (1976). One other speech mentioned the problem of civil discovery
in broad terms. See Simon H. Rifkind, Are We Asking too Much of Our Courts?, 70
F.R.D. 96, 107 (1976).
242. Kirkham, supra note 241, at 202.
243. William H. Erickson, The Pound Conference Recommendations: A Blueprint for
the Justice System in the Twenty-First Century, 76 F.R.D. 277, 288 (1977).
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A post-Pound Conference paper written in 1977 by federal judge
William H. Becker concluded that abusive discovery by lawyers in recurring civil cases was rare: “it is a tribute to the good sense and the
good faith of the Bar that the necessity for judicial action in an ordinary conventional civil case is an exceptional occurrence.”244 Federal
Judge Milton Pollack, writing in 1978, agreed: “Few, if any, abuses of
discovery exist in connection with ordinary litigation.”245
Yet by 1983 the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were twice
amended to remedy the problem of discovery abuse, including adding
a provision to Rule 11 allowing the court to sanction lawyers.246 What
happened?
Between the Pound Conference and 1980, more lawyers and
judges argued discovery abuse had infected ordinary civil cases. ABA
President William Spann wrote in his monthly ABA Journal column
that discovery abuse was a cause of court congestion.247 In the Spring
1978 issue of Litigation, a quarterly magazine of the ABA Section on
Litigation, federal judge John F. Grady attacked the increase in litigation costs, which he placed at the feet of lawyers.248 In Grady’s view,
“Much pretrial work is done primarily for the purpose of generating
fees.”249 Many in the legal profession agreed with the 1980 Report of
the Special Committee for the Study of Discovery Abuse of the ABA
Section on Litigation: “The special committee continues to believe that
there is serious and widespread abuse of discovery.”250 The complaints continued. A lawyer opened a 1981 essay by stating, “Discov244. Id. at 277; accord Peter Gruenberger, Discovery from Class Members: A Fertile
Field for Abuse, LITIGATION, Fall 1977, at 35.
245. Judge Milton Pollack, Discovery—Its Abuse and Correction, 80 F.R.D. 219, 222
(1978). This was also the view taken by the Standing Committee on Rules of Practice
and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the United States: “abuse of discovery,
while very serious in certain cases, is not so general as to require such basic changes in
the rules that govern discovery in all cases.” Revised Preliminary Draft of Proposed
Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 80 F.R.D. 323, 332 (1979).
246. Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 85 F.R.D. 521 (1980); Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 97 F.R.D. 165 (1983).
247. Wm. B. Spann, Jr., President’s Page, 64 A.B.A. J. 157, 157 (1978).
248. John F. Grady, Trial Lawyers, Litigators, and Clients’ Costs, LITIGATION,
Spring 1978, at 5.
249. Id. at 58. He also noted that “featherbedding practices” were a basic problem of
ethics, which could be improved only “from changing attitudes and determined effort on
the part of concerned lawyers and judges.” Id.
250. Philip H. Corboy, Second Report of the Special Committee for the Study of Discovery Abuse (January 1980), LITIG. NEWS, Apr. 1980, at 9, 10. Justice Powell, dissenting from the decision to forward to Congress the 1980 amendments for approval, quoted
that language in agreement. See Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
85 F.R.D. at 521 (Powell, J., dissenting) (quoting ABA Section of Litigation, SECOND
REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE FOR THE STUDY OF DISCOVERY ABUSE (1980)).
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ery has become an instrument of abuse and oppression,” a situation
“caused” by lawyers.251
The Kutak Commission did discuss briefly the ethics of lawyer
behavior in pretrial discovery matters. The first such mention in the
Journal is during its June 1978 meeting. The Commission discussed
whether “dilatory tactics” by lawyers should be subject to a standard
of concededly “questionable enforcement value.”252 It made no recommendations, and the issue was not again touched upon before the Discussion Draft was issued in January 1980.
In a 1980 case, Judge Grady excoriated the lawyers representing
AT&T in a memorable exhortation: their conduct was “disgraceful . . .
the worst possible example that one could find of all the things that we
all decry so much about what the so-called litigators are doing to the
court system of this country.”253 He continued:
Every time I look at something that AT&T has done in this
case by way of pretrial discover[y] . . . I come away with a
feeling of depression that I find difficult to describe to you
and I hope that you have some sense of shame for what you
have done in this case.254
Shame is predicated on the idea of honor. Honor is conferred by a
community to one whose actions conform to the values held in that
community, and shame is reserved for those who fail to act honorably.255 The claim of the duty of client loyalty required a lessening (or
even severing) of any duty to “the court system.” In this world, one
lawyer’s discovery abuse was defended as another’s due diligence on
behalf of the client. The Discussion Draft intended to create enforceable limits to such behavior. Such limits had been subject to “extensive
criticism,” and in the Proposed Final Draft the Commission had
largely reversed itself. It was no wonder that L. Ray Patterson, the
Kutak Commission’s first Reporter, declared in a 1980 essay, “The
prevailing notion among lawyers seems to be that the lawyer’s duty of
loyalty to the client is the first, the foremost, and, on occasion, the only
duty of the lawyer.”256
251. Weyman I. Lundquist, Trial Lawyer or Litigator, LITIGATION, Summer 1981, at
3.
252. JOURNALS, OMAHA, NEBRASKA, JUNE 9-10, 1978, at 7.
253. Timothy S. Robinson, ‘Discovery’ Cases Abuse Due Process, WASH. POST, May
19, 1980.
254. Id.
255. See generally BERTRAM WYATT-BROWN, SOUTHERN HONOR: ETHICS & BEHAVIOR
IN THE OLD SOUTH (1982). I discuss the importance of honor in David Hoffman’s concept
of legal ethics in Michael Ariens, Lost and Found: David Hoffman and the History of
American Legal Ethics, 67 ARK. L. REV. 571, 594-98 (2014).
256. L. Ray Patterson, Legal Ethics and the Lawyer’s Duty of Loyalty, 29 EMORY L.J.
909, 918 (1980).
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B. “A DETERMINABLE PUBLIC INTEREST”
The earliest meetings of the Kutak Commission embraced a vision
of lawyering requiring the private practice lawyer to take into account
“a determinable public interest” when representing one’s clients.257
That vision was not unique to the Commission: it was consonant with
the ABA’s shift to an outward-looking body strongly supportive of lawyer service in the public interest.
Chief Justice Burger’s opening address at the 1976 Pound Conference praised the ABA for moving from an “elite group that reacted
with hostility to Pound in 1906 into a progressive body composed of
210,000 representative lawyers.”258 For those who believed President
Richard Nixon’s nomination of Burger to the Supreme Court was a
conservative response to the liberalism of the Warren Court,259 Burger’s praise of the ABA’s progressivism appears out of place. It was
not. Praise for progress remained commonplace.260 This was largely
due to the embrace by many influential lawyers and judges, including
in part Chief Justice Burger,261 of “legal liberalism.”262
Legal liberalism was the view that lawyers and courts could bring
about needed social reform.263 Its foundation was the 1954 decision in
Brown v. Board of Education,264 and more generally, the decisions of
the Warren Court from 1963-69.265 It was exemplified by the program
257. JOURNALS, NEW YORK CITY, NEW YORK, DECEMBER 16-17, 1977, at 14.
258. Burger, supra note 238, at 87.
259. See, e.g., VINCENT BLASI, THE BURGER COURT: THE COUNTER-REVOLUTION THAT
WASN’T (1983).
260. See STEVEN M. TELES, THE RISE OF THE CONSERVATIVE LEGAL MOVEMENT 23
(2008) (noting support of the ABA and other establishment institutions to “liberalize the
legal profession” due to fact that “[b]y the 1960s, liberalism had become the philosophy
of the middle ground”). Legal liberalism also fit comfortably within the Great Society,
which echoed through much of the 1970s.
261. Burger was quoted as chastising “young people who go into the law primarily
on the theory that they can change the world by litigation in the courts,” LAURA KALMAN, THE STRANGE CAREER OF LEGAL LIBERALISM 64 (1999) (quoting DAVID BRODER,
CHANGING OF THE GUARD: POWER AND LEADERSHIP IN AMERICA 235 (1980)). On the other
hand, he threatened to resign his Chief Justiceship if Richard Nixon appointed any one
of six desultory nominees publicly leaked to replace Hugo Black or John Marshall
Harlan II in late 1971. Nixon’s alleged response to Burger was “Fuck him. Fuck the
ABA.” See RICK PERLSTEIN, NIXONLAND: THE RISE OF A PRESIDENT AND THE FRACTURING
OF AMERICA 605 (2008). But Nixon acquiesced in major part, nominating former ABA
president Lewis F. Powell, Jr., and William H. Rehnquist to replace Black and Harlan.
See OXFORD COMPANION TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 1148 (2d ed.,
2005). Burger rejected some of the broader implications of legal liberalism, but wrote
for the Court in the racial desegregation/busing case of Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
262. See generally KALMAN, supra note 261.
263. Id. at 2.
264. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
265. See LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICS 207
(2000) (titling the section on the Court in that period as “History’s Warren Court”).
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of legal services for the poor (LSP) and the view of Sargent Shriver
and others on the capacity of the legal system to generate positive social change. By 1970, radical lawyers contemplated rejection of legal
liberalism.266 Few prominent lawyers promoted conservatism, with
the echo of disgraced 1950s McCarthyism.267 Liberal legalism seemed
a middle way between radicalism and “far right” conservatism. The
ABA and other elites fostered legal liberalism through claims for the
primacy of law during Watergate.268 Earlier the ABA championed
“new public interest lawyers,”269 as proposed by Yale law students.
This effort was another part of the ABA’s decade-old support for expanded civil legal services for the poor.
In 1963, after meeting with President Kennedy, a group of elite
and civil rights lawyers created the Lawyers’ Committee for Civil
Rights Under Law.270 The principal goal of the Lawyers’ Committee
was to serve as a liaison between lawyers and government and between local lawyers and national experts to aid the civil rights movement.271 The co-chairmen of the Lawyers’ Committee were Harrison
Tweed272 and Bernard “Bernie” Segal.273 Tweed was a founding and
named partner of the large New York law firm of Milbank, Tweed,
266. See Ariens, supra note 15, at 161-67 (discussing rise of “movement” lawyers,
those who supported the civil rights, student and anti-Vietnam War movements, and
who were estranged from liberal solutions to social problems).
267. See AUERBACH, supra note 73, at 7 (noting that during Cold War lawyers “not
only permitted but encouraged the sacrifice of the rights of politically unpopular lawyers and defendants to public (and professional) hysteria.”); see also id. at 237-39 (noting ABA proposed loyalty oaths and worked otherwise to drive “Communist” lawyers
from the profession). For a corrective, see Rebecca Roiphe, Redefining Professionalism,
26 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 193, 221-29 (2015) (noting internal dissent within ABA in
1950s regarding Cold War threats and McCarthy).
268. See Jonathan Simon, Law after Society, 24 L. & SOC. INQ. 143, 173 (1999) (noting Watergate “crisis and its result seemed a striking victory for both the left and for
legal liberalism in particular”); see also text accompanying note 62; Alexander Bickel,
Watergate and the Legal Order, COMMENTARY, Jan. 1974, at 19 (noting danger of making law primary to all other social goods).
269. Robert Borosage et al., The New Public Interest Lawyers, 79 YALE L.J. 1069-70
(1970).
270. See CONNELL, supra note 46, at 74-114 (discussing creation and early development of Lawyers’ Committee); see also ADVANCING THE LAW, supra note 5, at 9 (discussing creation of Lawyers’ Committee and its relation to creation of ABA Section of
Individual Rights and Responsibilities).
271. CONNELL, supra note 46, at 102-05.
272. On Tweed, see Robert MacCrate, Tweed, Harrison, in YALE BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN LAW at 555; Roger K. Newman, Tweed, Harrison, in DICTIONARY
OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY, SUPPLEMENT EIGHT 1966-1970, at 662 (John A. Garraty &
Mark C. Carnes eds., 1988); Harrison Tweed, Lawyer and Civic Leader, Dead, N.Y.
TIMES, June 17, 1969, at 47.
273. On Segal, see Arlin M. Adams, Segal, Bernard G., in YALE BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN LAW at 488; Bernard G. Segal, 129 U. PENN. L. REV. 1023 (1981).
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Hadley and McCloy. He was a long-time legal aid proponent274 and
the “most democratic of aristocrats.”275 Among other public service
activities, Tweed served three terms as President of the ABCNY. In
his 1945 inaugural address he asked the audience to “engage more
whole-heartedly . . . in things which concern the public good.”276 Segal was a founding and named partner of a large Philadelphia firm.
As one biographer wrote, “Segal was a passionate advocate for his clients, for the legal profession and judiciary, and for the rights of the
poor and disadvantaged.”277 Segal was an active ABA member who
served as ABA President in 1969.278 A tribute by lawyer William T.
Coleman, Jr., praised Segal for emulating Louis Brandeis’s practice of
serving as “counsel for the situation,” a lawyer who acted to resolve
problems beyond simply the legal needs of his client.279
The ABA created a Special Committee on Civil Rights and Racial
Unrest to draft a resolution concerning civil rights after the Kennedy
meeting.280 The ABA then adopted the Special Committee’s recommendation.281 That same year, Lewis Powell282 became President of
the ABA. Two of his three priorities were creating a committee to
draft a new ethics code and expanding legal services available to the
poor through increased private funding.283 The Wright Committee
274. See JOHNSON, JUSTICE AND REFORM, supra note 26, at 8 (quoting Tweed, “Anybody who has had anything to do with legal aid knows that local bar associations do not
always rally to a man in a fight to the finish for the establishment of adequate service to
the poor.”). Tweed was criticized by a Ford Foundation-supported entity, Mobilization
for Youth, for suggesting civil legal needs of the poor had lessened between the 1920s
and 1960s). See id. at 46 (quoting deputy director of Mobilization for Youth).
275. Id. at 556.
276. Id.
277. Adams, supra note 273, at 488.
278. Arlin M. Adams, Bernard G. Segal, 129 U. PENN. L. REV. 1023, 1026-27 (1981).
He also served as President of the American College of Trial Lawyers in 1964, an elite
and national organization of lawyers. See id. at 1027; see generally MARION A. ELLIS &
HOWARD E. COVINGTON, JR., SAGES OF THEIR CRAFT: THE FIRST FIFTY YEARS OF THE
AMERICAN COLLEGE OF TRIAL LAWYERS (2000).
279. William T. Coleman, Jr., Bernard G. Segal: Lawyer for the Situation, 129 U.
PENN. L. REV. 1035 (1981). Coleman himself is a well-known and highly-regarded lawyer. See Louis H. Pollak, Coleman, William Thaddeus, Jr., in YALE BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN LAW at 123. On Brandeis and the “counsel for the situation,” see
John P. Frank, The Legal Ethics of Louis D. Brandeis, 17 STAN. L. REV. 683, 702 (1965);
see generally MELVIN I. UROFSKY, LOUIS D. BRANDEIS: A LIFE (2009).
280. ADVANCING THE LAW, supra note 5, at 10.
281. House of Delegates Proceedings, 89 A.B.A. ANN. REP. 395-96424 (1964) (adopting resolution to implement principles stated in Special Committee’s Report); see also
Report of the Special Committee on Civil Rights and Racial Unrest, 88 A.B.A. ANN. REP.
614 (1963). William B. Spann, Jr., was a member of this Committee.
282. On Powell, see JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR., JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR. (1994).
283. Sessions of the Assembly at the Annual Meeting of 1964, 89 A.B.A. ANN. REP.
348, 364 (1964) (listing three priorities, the last of which concerned the representation
of indigents charged with committing a crime).
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drafted the Code of Professional Responsibility adopted by the ABA.
Expanding civil legal services for the poor soon changed in dimension.
In fall 1964, the newly-created Office of Economic Opportunity
(“OEO”), located in the executive branch and directed by Sargent
Shriver, began considering creating a federal program of civil legal
services for the poor.284 Powell was quickly persuaded of its benefits.
He persuaded a somewhat reluctant House of Delegates to support the
program. It did so in a unanimous vote in February 1965.285
Once the ABA decided to support the LSP, it was all-in. Lawyers
working in the LSP program were engaged in significant law reform
efforts by 1968.286 California Senator George Murphy introduced in
October 1969 an amendment (the Murphy Amendment) “to prevent
legal services programs from handling cases against governmental
agencies and officials and from engaging in test cases, both of which
are integral parts of the national OEO legal services program.”287
The ABA Section on Individual Rights and Responsibilities took the
lead in organizing ABA opposition to the Murphy Amendment. The
Section was created by the ABA in 1966 to supplant the Special Committee on Civil Rights and Racial Unrest.288 It adopted a resolution
opposing the Murphy Amendment for ABA approval.289 ABA President Bernie Segal cajoled the board of governors into unanimously approving the resolution,290 and the ABA succeeded in killing the
Murphy Amendment.291 One early assessment concluded the ABA
was “instrumental in defending [the LSP] from attacks which in effect
284. See JOHNSON, JUSTICE AND REFORM, supra note 26, at 39–43.
285. See generally id. at 49-70; see also TELES, supra note 260, at 32–34 (discussing
ABA’s decision to support federal civil legal aid program); JEFFRIES, POWELL, supra note
282, at 197-201 (noting Powell’s influence in obtaining support by House of Delegates
for legal services program). House of Delegates Proceedings, 90 A.B.A. ANN. REP. 95,
110–11 (1965) (noting vote).
286. JOHNSON, JUSTICE AND REFORM, supra note 26, at 192; see also STOSSEL, supra
note 65, at 441 (listing March 17, 1967 as the date law reform was made the top priority
of the LSP).
287. John D. Robb, Controversial Cases and the Legal Services Program, 56 A.B.A.
J. 329, 329 (1970). This was the second time Murphy introduced his amendment; see
also JOHNSON, JUSTICE AND REFORM, supra note 26, at 219-33.
288. See ADVANCING THE LAW, supra note 5, at 10.
289. See Report No. 3 of the Section of Individual Rights and Responsibilities, 95
A.B.A. ANN. REP. 390, 390 (1970) (noting Committee led “the fight to defeat the Murphy
Amendment which would have placed crippling restrictions on the legal services programs of the nation.”).
290. JOHNSON, supra note 26, at 224 (noting Segal’s persuasive skills and quoting
resolution).
291. See Editorial, Defeat of the Murphy Amendment, 56 A.B.A. J. 244, 244-45
(1970); see also F. RAYMOND MARKS WITH KIRK LESWING & BARBARA A. FORTINSKY, THE
LAWYER, THE PUBLIC, AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 186 (1972).
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were saying that the reform elements of the program were either too
controversial or too effective.”292
The ABA was not an outlier. President Richard Nixon, through
his appointee as head of OEO, Donald Rumsfeld, had told LSP staff in
May 1969 that “we support Legal Services.”293 In November, Rumsfeld testified before Congress and gave a “full-throated defense of law
reform including the kinds of cases Senator Murphy had made clear
he was intent on quashing.”294 In addition, nearly all of the organized
bar joined the ABA in opposing the Murphy Amendment, and most
agreed that LSP should engage in law reform as part of providing “a
full spectrum of services.”295
The approach of the LSP thus departed from the traditional idea
that lawyers acted in service of their clients’ needs. To allow LSP lawyers to go beyond that model and engage in law reform efforts “invited
[LSP lawyers] to become ‘lawyers for the situation’ and not merely advocates for the immediate client and his immediately articulated
needs.”296 This invitation led to resistance by some state and local
governmental officials sued by LSP lawyers.297 One example involved
the funding controversy between California Governor Ronald Reagan
and California Rural Legal Aid.298
Shortly after defeat of the second Murphy Amendment, Jerome
Shestak,299 chairman of the ABA Section on Individual Rights and
Responsibilities, successfully obtained funding from the Ford Foundation for a proposal that involved “ ‘the higher calling of law’—the obligation of lawyers to become involved in the overriding concerns of
society.”300 The Section, Ford, and the ABA Board of Governors eventually agreed on a project aiding interested private law firms that
wished to create “public interest branches of their firms.”301
292.
293.
294.
295.
296.
297.

Id. at 186.
JOHNSON, ESTABLISH JUSTICE, supra note 26, at 208.
Id. at 231.
Robb, supra note 287, at 331.
MARKS, supra note 291, at 55-56.
See generally SUSAN E. LAWRENCE, THE POOR IN COURT: THE LEGAL SERVICES
PROGRAM AND SUPREME COURT DECISION MAKING (1990) (noting successes of LSP lawyers in taking cases of the poor to the Supreme Court in the late 1960s and early 1970s).
298. JOHNSON, ESTABLISH JUSTICE, supra note 26, at 273-306.
299. On Shestak, see Adam Liptak, Jerome Shestak, Diplomat and Bar Association
Leader, Dies at 88, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 24, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/24/us/
24shestack.html?_r=1 (last visited February 1, 2016). Shestak worked in the same firm
as Bernard Segal and was later a president of the ABA. He was a driving force in the
1963 creation of the Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights Under Law. See CONNELL,
supra note 46, at 96-97.
300. MARKS, supra note 291, at 189.
301. Id. (quoting ABA staff proposal).
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The ABA created a number of committees and generated reports
detailing the work of public interest lawyers and programs during the
early and mid-1970s. For example, the 1977 Annual Report of the
ABA’s Fund for Public Education noted the receipt of “nearly nine million dollars . . . during fiscal year 1977,” most of which came from
“foundations, government agencies, and corporations.”302 These gifts
showed the “philanthropic community’s regard for the ABA’s ability
and willingness to initiate studies into new areas of professional and
public interest.”303 The first two of four programs funded were for
professional impact on public issues projects, and access to justice and
legal services projects.304 The first set of projects “focused on exploring legal aspects of complex social and economic issues in such fields
as corrections, mental health, regulatory reform, and medical malpractice.”305 These projects were aided by the creation of commissions
by the ABA, including the Commission on Correctional Facilities and
Services in 1970, a Commission on the Mentally Disabled in 1974, and
Commissions on Law and the Economy and on Medical Professional
Liability, both created in 1975.306
The second project area was access to justice. As stated in the
Annual Report, “For a number of years, the ABA has been interested
in this area, particularly as it relates to the availability of legal services for low and middle-income Americans.”307 One of the many
projects funded in this program area aimed “to find long-term, institutionalized solutions for financing law practice in the public
interest.”308
In August 1975, the ABA House of Delegates approved a resolution from the Special Committee on Public Interest Practice “that it is
a basic professional responsibility of each lawyer engaged in the practice of law to provide public interest services.”309 It also approved the
Special Committee’s definition of a “public interest legal service” as
302. About the FPE, 1977 Annual Report, THE FUND FOR PUBLIC EDUCATION OF THE
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION 1 (n.d.) (noting 75% of receipts “provided by foundations,
government agencies, and corporations”).
303. Id. at 2.
304. Id. at 4. The third and fourth program areas were model codes and other legal
standards projects, and professional service and education projects. Id.
305. Id.
306. Id. at 4-7.
307. Id. at 8.
308. Id.; see also Justice Thurgood Marshall, Financing Public Interest Law Practice: The Role of the Organized Bar, 61 A.B.A. J. 1487 (1975).
309. See House of Delegates Proceedings, 100 A.B.A. ANN. REP. 642, 684 (1975). The
House of Delegates amended the resolution by replacing “obligation” with “responsibility”; see Report of the Special Committee on Public Interest Practice, 100 A.B.A. ANN.
REP. 965 (1975) (printing original resolution); PUBLIC INTEREST LAW: FIVE YEARS LATER
45 (1976) (re-publishing Recommendations of Committee in Appendix A).
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work provided at a reduced fee or for no fee, in one of the following
areas: poverty law, civil rights law, public rights law, charitable organization representation, or the administration of justice.310 The
last category, which included bar association activities, had been added since the House of Delegates had postponed action on the Special
Committee’s resolution at the Midyear Meeting in February 1975.311
The first three categories of public interest legal services, poverty law,
civil rights, and public rights, were the mainstay of work undertaken
in the LSP. Public interest law, as Justice Thurgood Marshall wrote
in a Foreword to the Special Committee’s booklet on this topic, was
“built upon the earlier successes of civil rights, civil liberties and legal
aid lawyers,” but had now been extended to encompass “a broad range
of relatively powerless minorities—for example, to the mentally ill, to
children, to the poor of all races.”312 Two years later, the Special Committee issued a report titled “Implementing the Lawyers’ Public Interest Obligation.”313
The ABA’s legal liberalism reached a peak in 1977. That year the
Section on Individual Rights and Responsibilities asked the ABA
House of Delegates to adopt a resolution asking state legislatures “to
repeal all laws providing for the imposition of the death penalty.”314
This resolution, made after the Supreme Court reinstated the option
of the death penalty in Gregg v. Georgia,315 indicated the view of a
substantial number within the ABA: they were to lead legislatures,
courts, and society. Although the resolution failed in the House, it
was apparent ABA leaders strongly supported a “philosophy of modernization and progress.”316
Legal liberalism represented a faith in the power of law and of
lawyers to effect positive social change. For elite lawyers, this faith in
legal progress, which included repeated declarations concerning the
duty of lawyers to the public interest, allowed them to categorize the
310. House of Delegates Proceedings, 100 A.B.A. ANN. REP. 642, 684 (1975); Report of
the Special Committee on Public Interest Practice, 100 A.B.A. ANN. REP. 965 (1975).
311. Compare Report of the Special Committee on Public Interest Practice, 100
A.B.A. ANN. REP. 392 (1975) (printing original resolution postponed at Midyear Meeting), with Report of the Special Committee on Public Interest Practice, 100 A.B.A. ANN.
REP. 965 (1975) (printing amended resolution filed for Annual Meeting).
312. Thurgood Marshall, Foreword to PUBLIC INTEREST LAW: FIVE YEARS LATER 6
(1976).
313. See 63 A.B.A. J. 678 (1977) (reprinting report in part). The Report used its
original word “obligation,” not “responsibility,” as the resolution was approved by the
ABA House of Delegates.
314. Report of the Section of Individual Rights and Responsibilities, 102 A.B.A. ANN.
REP. 385 (1977). Debate on the resolution is found in House of Delegates Proceedings,
102 A.B.A. ANN. REP. at 230-32.
315. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
316. TELES, supra note 260, at 34. Teles emphasizes the influence of the Ford Foundation in supporting the ABA’s work in support of public interest law. Id. at 34-35.
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actions of lawyers in the Watergate scandal as an outlier.317 It also
led them to embrace a model of legal ethics that emphasized the lawyer’s duties to the public.
Despite the defeat of the Murphy Amendment in 1970, the LSP
remained controversial, and its location within the executive branch of
President Richard Nixon concerned those who supported it. In early
1971, the ABA Section on Individual Rights and Responsibilities and
the ABA Standing Committee on Legal Aid and Indigent Defendants
approved a jointly created document, The Corporation for Legal Services: A Proposal.318 A bill creating a Legal Services Corporation was
introduced in the House of Representatives by Wisconsin Republican
William “Bill” Steiger.319 In late July 1974, Congress passed the bill
creating the Legal Services Corporation.320
Kutak was one of the first persons asked to serve on the Board of
the Legal Services Corporation.321 A second member of the Kutak
Commission, Samuel Thurman, was also appointed to the inaugural
board,322 and a third, Thomas Ehrlich, was the Corporation’s first
President. All three believed in public service, and each accepted the
premise that law and litigation were an opportunity for public good.
The members of the Kutak Commission were committed to the
ABA’s liberal legalism. They embraced a faith in law, and believed
that lawyers who confessed an attachment to the public profession of
law would aid in society’s progress. Kutak Commission members also
believed they were leaders whose work “ought not to hesitate to promulgate statements of ethics it believes to be correct but which may
not meet with the general approval of the Bar.”323
In a recent assessment by Earl Johnson, who served as the second
director of the LSP, “Many if not a majority of mainstream Republicans were on OEO-LSP’s side, along with most but not all Democrats.
It was the far right Republicans and a few Southern Democrats who
were the loudest and most determined critics.”324
317. See Ariens, supra note 15 (discussing response by ABA leaders to Watergate).
318. See John D. Robb, New Niche for National Legal Services, 57 A.B.A. J. 557,
558-59 (1971).
319. JOHNSON, ESTABLISH JUSTICE, supra note 26, at 358.
320. Id. at 424-25. Two months earlier, the conservative publication Human Events
warned Nixon not to allow any Legal Services Corporation bill to become law, or see his
waning political support further fall away. California Governor Ronald Reagan also
urged Nixon to veto the bill. Id. at 416-17.
321. Id. at 452-53.
322. Id. at 454.
323. JOURNALS, NEW YORK CITY, NEW YORK, DECEMBER 16-17, 1977, at 16.
324. Id. at 443.
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By 1975, about ninety liberal public interest law firms existed.325
Although those assessing the effectiveness of public interest law were
concerned about defining public interest,326 the general perception of
what constituted public interest law was close to the ABA’s definition:
poverty law, civil rights law, and public rights law, joined together in
large part by the goal of assisting those persons with little or no political power (as well as protecting the environment).
In the last half of the 1970s, conservative lawyers began to create
public interest law firms to compete with liberal public interest
firms.327 Edwin Meese, who worked for Governor and President Reagan, helped establish the Pacific Legal Foundation,328 and by 1978, a
number of other conservative public interest law firms had been created.329 One goal of these firms was to “challenge[ ] the suggestion
sometimes made by liberal public interest law groups that the positions they took reflected the public interest.”330 As one conservative
public interest lawyer wrote, liberal public interest groups “are, in
fact, special interest groups and no different from . . . attempts to lobby
public opinion and garner governmental support for a particular
cause. Their use of the ‘public interest’ label is a ruse and a
disguise.”331
Ronald Reagan handily won the 1980 presidential election. Four
years earlier, though he had been labeled too conservative,332 he
nearly wrested the Republican presidential nomination from the more
moderate Gerald Ford, who became President after Nixon’s resigna325. ANN SOUTHWORTH, LAWYERS OF THE RIGHT: PROFESSIONALIZING THE CONSERVACOALITION 12 (2008); cf. BURTON A. WEISBROD et al., PUBLIC INTEREST LAW: AN
ECONOMIC AND INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS 50-51 (1978) (concluding 86 public interest law
firms existed by the end of 1975).
326. See WEISBROD, supra note 325, at 22, 26-29.
327. This was part of a broader effort by conservatives to found and fund think
tanks. The Heritage Foundation was formed in 1973, the Cato Institute in 1976, and
the Pacific Research Institute in 1979. See CHARLES MURRAY, BY THE PEOPLE: REBUILDING LIBERTY WITHOUT PERMISSION 3 (2015).
328. SOUTHWORTH, supra note 325, at 15.
329. Id.
330. Id. at 16 (emphasis in original).
331. Id. at 17 (emphasis in original) (quoting Dan Burt). A concerted effort to reform conservative public interest law groups took place in 1980, with the goal of creating conservative public interest law firms that were more “vibrant, intellectually
respectable” centers capable of competing with the best liberal public interest law firms.
Id. at 19 (quoting Michael Horowitz); see also TELES, supra note 260, at 67 (quoting
Horowitz, “young men and women are tired, as is everybody, of the old answers. Yet,
nobody has sufficiently offered young lawyers the sense that one can be caring, moral,
intellectual, appropriately ideological, while at the same time being radically opposed to
the stale views of the left.”).
332. See generally RICK PERLSTEIN, THE INVISIBLE BRIDGE: THE FALL OF NIXON AND
THE RISE OF REAGAN (2014).
TIVE
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tion.333 Reagan’s election was a triumph for political conservativism,
and offered some vindication to conservative lawyers who dissented
from the consensus view that liberal public interest law was public
interest law. By 1980, this consensus was challenged by more than
just “far right Republicans and a few Southern Democrats.” Reagan
proposed abolishing the Legal Services Corporation soon after taking
office.334 The conservative challenge to the definition of “public interest” made it that much more difficult for ordinary lawyers to discern
what it meant to act in the public interest. The conservative challenge, occurring at the same time as the Kutak Commission began its
work, increased the difficulty of the Kutak Commission’s mandate.
The Kutak Commission’s desire to require lawyers to serve “a discernable public interest” was not just controversial, but possibly
incoherent.
C. “A DOG-EAT-DOG WORLD”
In a posthumously published essay in the book The Good Lawyer,
Kutak defended the Commission’s proposals on the limits of client
confidences. Those limits existed, he wrote, because “[i]t may be a
dog-eat-dog world, but one dog may eat another only according to the
rules.”335 Kutak’s declaration may have meant more than he knew.
First, this statement offers a process-based understanding of law,
including the emerging law of lawyering. A lawyer could engage in
substantively execrable conduct as long as he or she followed the
rules. More specifically, a lawyer could engage in horrifying behavior
if the rules of lawyer conduct did not ban such behavior. Second, a
process-based understanding seemed contrary to the initial ethos of
the Commission, which called on lawyers to keep in mind the public’s
interest as well as their clients’ interests. One telling example of this
shift may be found in Kutak’s essay: on three occasions when discussing the limits of the lawyer’s duty to keep client confidences, he used
the phrase “public interest,” each time in quotation marks.336 Third,
a process-based approach required a keen attention to the language of
the rules, for that was the only measure of one’s behavior. Two consequences of this approach were 1) the elimination of guiding standards
in favor of bright-line rules, and 2) a “winner take all” mentality
among those debating and eventually voting on the Commission’s proposals. Reporter Geoffrey Hazard had reminded the Commission in
333. See id.
334. For a contemporaneous discussion, see Alexander D. Forger, The Challenge
Facing the Legal Profession, B. LEADER, May-June 1981, at 18 (noting proposal).
335. Robert J. Kutak, The Adversary System and the Practice of Law in THE GOOD
LAWYER 172, 175 (David Luban ed., 1984).
336. Id. at 183-84.
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mid-1979 that its job was “to draft rules that are the legal foundation
of good professional conduct but are not exhaustive of the subject.”337
For lawyers interested in “lawful” rather than “good” professional conduct, rules were all that mattered. Fourth, a “dog-eat-dog” world is a
social Darwinian world, one in which only the strongest survive.
Kutak reiterated this later in his essay, accepting that the American
adversary system was “in most respects Darwinian.”338
Kutak’s Good Lawyer essay noted that competition in the adversary system was common to American institutions: “The basic premise
of virtually all our institutions is that open and relatively unrestrained competition among individuals produces the maximum collective good.” Implicit in this statement is the belief that each
individual will decide whether, and if so how, to compete in this relatively free market. The job of the government is to enforce the rules of
competition. This free market vision, of course, had been re-framed by
the rise of the regulatory state during and after the New Deal, which
was both entrenched and challenged in 1980. More specifically, this
vision conflicted with the initial ethos of the Kutak Commission. The
Commission’s mission included a duty “to confront the ‘new law’ and
‘new ethics’ of today and tomorrow,”339 to fearlessly “promulgate
statements of ethics it believes to be correct but which may not meet
with the general approval of the Bar,”340 and to move lawyers from
the “basic posture” of client loyalty to service on behalf of the public.
Its initial efforts were the epitome of social trustee professionalism
rather than “dog-eat-dog” individualism. The Commission emphasized that the clarification and implementation of legal ethics rules
protected society by demanding lawyers meet “high practice standards” and undertake to act in “service in relation to the interests of
public safety, convenience, and welfare.”341 Social trustee professionalism had a long shelf life within the American legal profession.342
However, that professional ideal was unraveling as the Kutak Commission worked.
337. JOURNALS, SEATTLE, WASHINGTON, JUNE 29-30, 1979, at 16.
338. Kutak, Adversary System, supra note 335, at 177-78.
339. JOURNALS, NEW YORK CITY, NEW YORK, DECEMBER 16-17, 1977, at 16. It retained this view in the Discussion Draft, see DISCUSSION DRAFT, supra note 86, preface
(declaring “We have built on the Code’s foundation, but we make no apology for having
pushed beyond it. In many respects, we have been taken beyond the Model Code by
events . . . . ”); PROPOSED FINAL DRAFT, supra note 82, Chairman’s Introduction (“Our
drafting goal, in keeping with our mission, was to produce standards bottomed on the
law as it is but facing the future of a rapidly expanding and changing profession.”).
340. JOURNALS, NEW YORK CITY, NEW YORK, DECEMBER 16-17, 1977, at 16.
341. BRINT, supra note 18, at 36.
342. See id. (quoting lawyer John F. Dillon’s 1894 Address to the American Bar
Association).
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The 1975 decision by the ABA to declare it a “professional responsibility” of lawyers to perform public interest services suggests the
strength of the social trustee vision of elite lawyers. The author of a
1973 book on large New York law firms concluded with the call that
such lawyers become “more detached, more independent, someone
paid by the client but responsible to the general public.”343 Archibald
Cox, the fired Watergate prosecutor, gave a talk to the ABA Section on
Individual Rights and Responsibilities shortly after Nixon resigned in
1974. He called for “more sustained and wider study of where the balance should be struck between the conflicting duties of ‘hired gun’ and
‘servant of the law.’ ”344 He offered the warning that “under modern
circumstances loyalty is often more easily given to the client’s interests than to the people’s interests or the law.”345 Through much of the
1970s, elite lawyers expressed an optimism that lawyers remained
trustees who acted for the benefit of society, despite the Watergate
scandal. But for many lawyers, the 1970s were a time of great economic struggle. For elite lawyers, the repeated call for greater public
interest services was central to their mission as trustees. For many
lawyers, such calls were irrelevant to their struggles.
A study of the history of American economic productivity gains
calls 1870-1970 the “special century.”346 It also concludes “economic
growth since 1970 has been simultaneously dazzling and disappointing.”347 Lawyers have been both the beneficiaries and victims of
this post-1970 volatility in economic growth. The economic premium
awarded lawyers and others possessing more than bachelor’s degrees
dropped slightly from 1945-75, and rose slowly through the early
1980s.348 For lawyers, the decline was steeper. The economic premium earned by the median income lawyer compared with the median
income worker was 1.85 in 1969, so a lawyer earned almost twice as
much as the median American worker.349 By 1979, that premium declined to 1.35 times the median American worker.350 As noted by
Richard Sander and Douglass Williams, in constant 1983 dollars the
median lawyer in 1979 earned $36,716, compared with $47,638
343. PAUL HOFFMAN, LIONS IN THE STREET 227 (1973).
344. Archibald Cox, The Loss of Mystical Qualities Makes It Harder to Revere the
Law, STUDENT LAW., Feb. 1975, at 8, 10.
345. Id. at 10.
346. ROBERT J. GORDON, THE RISE AND FALL OF AMERICAN GROWTH: THE U.S. STANDARD OF LIVING SINCE THE CIVIL WAR 7 (2016).
347. Id. at 2.
348. Id. at 616.
349. Richard H. Sander & E. Douglass Williams, Why Are There So Many Lawyers?
Perspectives on a Turbulent Market, 14 LAW & SOC. INQ. 431, 448-49 (1989).
350. See id.
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earned by the median lawyer in 1969.351 The decline may be attributed to macroeconomic forces, for the premium seemed to strike all
those who possessed graduate or professional degrees. It also may be
attributable to the increase in the number of lawyers from 355,242 in
1970 to 542,205 in 1980.352 A third reason was the greater sorting of
private practice lawyers into two hemispheres, those who served corporations, and lawyers who largely represented individuals.353 Lawyers representing corporations began taking home a rising proportion
of monies spent on legal services from the 1960s though 1980.354 This
left the majority of lawyers in solo practice or working in small firms
with less of the economic pie, thus driving median income down. In
other words, the division of legal services income among lawyers was
shaping into a pyramid with a wider (lower-income) base and a narrower (higher-income) top.
The Discussion Draft was premised on the optimistic ideal that
lawyers could and should act both within and outside the market for
their legal services. In sum, they should serve both their paying clients and a public interest. By 1980, private practice lawyers began
rejecting that ideal in favor of an inward-looking technocratic profession.355 The competition to provide legal services to paying clients required lawyers to demonstrate their technical competence as well as
their loyalty to the client. It may also be the case that lawyers who
represented individuals decided the creation of the Legal Services
Corporation altered their public mission: the rise of professional, paid
public interest lawyers eliminated any duty of lawyers representing
individuals to serve the poor. Their mission was solely to serve their
paying clients well, or in the language of the Model Rules, diligently
and competently.
D. FRACTURED
The Final Draft of the Model Rules was published in the ABA’s
1982 Annual Report.356 It further modified the modifications made in
351. Id.
352. ABEL, supra note 67, at 280.
353. JOHN P. HEINZ & EDWARD O. LAUMANN, CHICAGO LAWYERS: THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF THE BAR 127 (rev. ed. 1994) (“[W]e have advanced the thesis that much of the
differentiation within the legal profession is secondary to one fundamental distinction—
the distinction between lawyers who represent large organizations (corporations, labor
unions, or government) and those who represent individuals.”).
354. See Sander & Williams, supra note 349, at 435-36.
355. For an interesting view from the mid-1970s of the “unofficial” power of lawyers,
see MARK J. GREEN, THE OTHER GOVERNMENT: THE UNSEEN POWER OF WASHINGTON
LAWYERS (1975).
356. See Report of the Commission on Evaluation of Professional Standards, 107
A.B.A. ANN. REP. 828, 833-920 (1982) [hereinafter “FINAL DRAFT”] (printing in June 30,
1982 Final Draft).
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the Proposed Final Draft, particularly in Rules 3.3 and 4.1. Rule
3.3(a) made more limited the lawyer’s duty to disclose facts to a tribunal. The failure of the lawyer to disclose a fact was no longer equated
with a lawyer’s making a material misrepresentation.357 Further, a
lawyer was required to disclose a “fact necessary to prevent a fraud on
the tribunal,” only “when disclosure is necessary to avoid assisting a
criminal or fraudulent act by the client.”358 The Final Draft also deleted the unnecessary Caveat regarding constitutional law.359 It retained the rule barring a lawyer from offering evidence the lawyer
knew to be false, including perjury by the criminally accused.
Rule 4.1 was amended to limit any duty to disclose “material”
facts,360 and the duty to disclose material facts arose only when disclosure was necessary for the lawyer to avoid assisting a client in a fraud
or crime. The Final Draft added a provision clarifying the duty to disclose even when this required disclosure of a client confidence.
The Report by Robert Kutak accompanying the Final Draft stated
the Commission’s work rested on three “broad principles: the transcendent importance of confidentiality in the professional relationship, the duty of loyalty to clients, and the requirement that lawyers
conform their conduct to law.”361 This seems hardly a list of principles at all. The third principle required the lawyer to follow the law,
but surely that is required of every person subject to American law.
The first principle, “confidentiality,” is a subset of the lawyer’s duty of
loyalty to the client, not a separate principle. While everyone agreed
the lawyer’s duty of loyalty to clients was a first order principle (it was
the “basic posture” of the Code), part of the Commission’s initial goal
was to remind lawyers that client loyalty was not the only duty they
possessed. Noticeably absent from the list is any duty of the lawyer to
the public. More specifically, the list omits any duty of the lawyer to
serve as an officer of the court. Just fifteen months earlier, Kutak’s
Introduction to the Proposed Final Draft argued the lawyer was not
only “a representative of the client but also an officer of the court.”362
The language “officer of the court” was absent from Kutak’s Report. A
similar phrase was left in the Preamble: A Lawyer’s Responsibilities,
but it was reduced in significance. In the Proposed Final Draft, the
Preamble began, “A lawyer is an officer of the legal system, a repre357. Id. at 873 (deleting language in Rule 3.3(a)(1)).
358. Id. (amending language in Rule 3.3(a)(2)).
359. Id. at 874.
360. Id. at 882. That the fact be “material” was also added to Rule 3.3(a).
361. Report, 107 A.B.A. ANN. REP. at 829. He repeated that statement in his opening address to the House of Delegates. See House of Delegates Proceedings, 107 A.B.A.
ANN. REP. 603, 615 (1982).
362. PROPOSED FINAL DRAFT, supra note 82, Chairman’s Introduction.
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sentative of clients, and a public citizen having special responsibility
for the quality of justice.”363 In the Final Draft, the order was
changed: “A lawyer is a representative of clients, an officer of the legal
system and a public citizen having special responsibility for the quality of justice.”364 The “basic posture” of the Code remained enshrined
in the Model Rules.
The Report explained why the Final Draft required the lawyer to
disclose perjury and barred the lawyer from knowingly offering false
material evidence. It did so largely for reasons of lawyer self-protection. If a lawyer was not allowed to disclose that she had unknowingly
introduced false evidence, and now was aware it was false, then she
was effectively required “to assist in a client’s crime of fraud.”365 And
if the Commission (and the broader legal profession) failed to answer
this question in the Model Rules, it was “abdicating the bar’s responsibilities of self-regulation.”366 That might lead to the imposition of
rules of conduct by outside regulators, long anathema to the bar.
In all, a “fair study of the Model Rules’ confidentiality provisions”
demonstrated they were not “an attack on the adversary system [nor
did they] tilt away from a concern for clients toward a concern for
third parties and society at large. In fact, the Rules work[ed] no such
shift in the profession’s values.”367 Kutak reiterated this point later
in the Report. In again justifying the proposals regarding the limits of
keeping client confidences, he argued the Model Rules met the goal of
“guiding lawyers in their duties of zealous representation of clients
and honest dealings with others.”368 The return to the adjective “zealous,” after zealous efforts to scrub it from the Model Rules, indicates
the extent to which the Commission wished to avoid any appearance
of a threat to the “basic posture” of the lawyer as agent or “hired
gun”369 of the client. The only use of “zealous” in the approved version
of the Model Rules is found in the Preamble. It was added after the
Proposed Final Draft, and replaced the word “vigorous.”370
363. Id.
364. FINAL DRAFT, supra note 356, at 834; see id. at 835 (also reversing the order of
the lawyer’s status later in the Preamble).
365. Id. at 829.
366. Id.
367. Id. at 830.
368. Id. at 832.
369. The phrase “hired gun” was not used to refer to lawyers in any law or bar journal until 1970. See Ariens, supra note 23, at 587–88 (discussing etymology of “hired
gun” as applied to lawyers). By 1980, it had become both much more commonplace, and
a phrase that was embraced as often as it was viewed as an epithet. See id.
370. See Report of the Commission on Evaluation of Ethical Standards, 107 A.B.A.
ANN. REP. 828, 835 (1982) (showing marked up changes between Proposed Final Draft
(1981) and Final Draft (1982)). The Commission had earlier replaced “zealous” with
“vigorous.”
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The Commission made these changes because that was its only
option. If the Model Rules were to be adopted by the ABA after years
of controversy, the Commission needed to pledge fealty to the “basic
posture.” Three years had passed since the working draft had been
given to a select group. Since then, as Kutak drily noted, “the Commission has had the benefit of extensive comments from hundreds of
bar associations and individuals.”371
Substantive discussions in the House of Delegates at the 1982 Annual Meeting produced a cacophony of positions, some more nuanced
than others, and often contradictory.372 The House began with Model
Rule 1.5, governing fees. Its discussion was lengthy. The terse report
of the Proceedings in the House notes that, after the first proposed
amendment to Rule 1.5 was made, debate was twice interrupted “with
parliamentary and procedural inquiries.”373 Amendments were offered, some of which passed, and others of which failed.374 Exasperation set in. Even after the House agreed to the amended Rule, a
member asked for another change, which failed.375
The House then moved to Rule 1.6 on confidences. A delegate
moved to amend the Rule by making it mandatory for a lawyer to disclose a client confidence about a future crime likely to result in another’s death or serious bodily injury (this was in Discussion Draft
Rule 1.7(b), but changed to a permissive disclosure in Proposed Final
Draft Rule 1.6(b)(2) and Final Draft Rule 1.6(b)(1)). Hazard then
listed amendments from nine different bar organizations on Rule 1.6.
Some wanted to make some disclosures mandatory; others wanted to
eliminate some of the Final Draft’s proposed permissive disclosures.
After several motions to amend failed, Commission member and
House delegate Robert Meserve urged the House to defer consideration of the Model Rules until its February 1983 Midyear Meeting.376
Another delegate offered a substitute motion to discharge the Commission, thank the members for their service, and appoint a Special
Committee to report back, because “a fresh approach was needed.”377
371. Id. at 830. Exhibit D of the Report listed comments from over 100 persons and
associations on the Proposed Final Draft. See id. at 920-21 (listing commenters). This
did not include some of those who had only commented on the Discussion Draft, which
itself consisted of four volumes.
372. Id. at 830 (noting that in reviewing comments to Proposed Final Draft, the
Commission had “the consequent disadvantage of having to reconcile sometimes irreconcilable views.”).
373. House of Delegates Proceedings, 107 A.B.A. ANN. REP. at 616.
374. Id. at 617-22.
375. Id. at 624 (noting request of Erwin N. Griswold).
376. Id. at 627.
377. Id. at 628.
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The substitute was defeated, and the Meserve motion was adopted.
The fate of Rule 1.6 was deferred for six months.
The 1983 Midyear Meeting was also contentious. Reporter Geoffrey Hazard ruefully noted the delay “gave the opposition time to organize, which it did very effectively.”378 The Drafting Committee
reported “thirty-eight organizations and individuals submitted 216
proposed amendments” to the Final Draft of the Model Rules.379
These amendments were proposed after the Rules had undergone significant changes between the time of the Proposed Final Draft in mid1981 and the Final Draft of mid-1982.380 For example, the Final
Draft prohibited a lawyer from counseling or assisting a client in criminal or fraudulent conduct, but only when the lawyer “knew” the client
was engaged in such conduct. The Proposed Final Draft had imposed
that prohibition when the lawyer “reasonably should know” the client’s conduct was criminal or fraudulent.381 Even so, the delegates
were not finished with Rule 1.2(d), which was further amended after a
lengthy discussion and in a 158-144 vote.382
On and on it went, for five sessions over two long days. Rule
1.6(b), which addressed exceptions to client confidences, was amended
to reduce the instances of permissive disclosures. The House agreed
to eliminate the lawyer’s discretion to disclose a client’s statement
about a future fraud or crime that would cause substantial injury to
another’s financial interests or to rectify the consequences of a fraud
in which the lawyer’s services were used.383 The final provisions regarding exceptions to client confidences were almost a complete turnaround from the Working Draft, and now nearly mirrored ATLA’s
Code. A subsequent effort failed to make mandatory the disclosure of
a client confidence when another’s life or physical safety was
threatened.384
378. Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Rectification of Client Fraud: Death and Revival of a
Professional Norm, 33 EMORY L.J. 271, 302 (1984).
379. See Report of the Drafting Committee, 108 A.B.A. ANN. REP. 728, 728 (1983); see
also Report of the Drafting Committee, 108 A.B.A. ANN. REP. 1136, 1137 (1983) (printing approved version of Model Rules of Professional Conduct, including Preamble,
Scope, and Comments).
380. The changes can be seen in a marked up version found as Exhibit A to Report of
the Commission on Evaluation of Ethical Standards, 107 A.B.A. ANN. REP. 828, 833
(1982).
381. See FINAL DRAFT, supra note 356, at 840. The Final Draft eliminated much of
the “reasonably should know” language found in the Proposed Final Draft.
382. Compare PROPOSED FINAL DRAFT, supra note 82, r. 1.2(d), with House of Delegates Proceedings, 108 A.B.A. ANN. REP. 289, 293 (deleting above-quoted language).
383. House of Delegates Proceedings, 108 A.B.A. ANN. REP. 289, 295-98. On Hazard’s disagreement with the decision of the House of Delegates, see Hazard, supra note
378.
384. House of Delegates Proceedings, 108 A.B.A. ANN. REP. 289, 299. On subsequent
changes to this provision, see Ariens, supra note 84.
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The success of those amending Rule 1.6 indicated similar changes
might come to Rule 3.3, which required disclosure to the tribunal if a
lawyer learned he introduced false evidence, and Rule 4.1, which concerned the duty to disclose material facts to a third person to avoid
assisting the client in a crime or fraud. A series of five amendments to
Rule 3.3, all designed to lessen or eliminate the duty to disclose perjury or the introduction of false evidence, failed.385 Rule 4.1 was
amended by a recorded vote of 188-127 to eliminate any duty to disclose if “disclosure is prohibited by Rule 1.6.”386
The House completed its amendments to the rules in February.
At its August 1983 meeting, it finally agreed to the contents of the
Preamble, Scope, and Comments.387 It then adopted the Model Rules
of Professional Conduct.
V. CONCLUSION
When the House of Delegates met in August 1983 to approve the
Model Rules, a delegate moved to strike the following statement in the
Preamble: “Thus, when an opposing party is well represented, a lawyer can be a zealous advocate on behalf of a client and at the same
time assume that justice is being done.” The sentence was apparently
offensive because it might imply that a lawyer was subject to discipline if the lawyer failed accurately to “determine the competence of
the opposing party’s lawyer.”388 This statement, other than the word
“vigorous” rather than “zealous,” was in the Discussion Draft Preamble, and remained unchanged through the Final Draft.389 Hazard
spoke in opposition to the amendment on the grounds that a comment
was not a disciplinary rule and more cryptically, that the “adversary
system contemplates opposing parties of substantial competence,” and
when such is not the case, “the assumptions of the adversary system
are not met.”390 On its face, Hazard’s explanation is clear and sensible. The American adversary system is premised on the idea that
each party’s lawyer is competent and diligent. However, Hazard’s
comment is cryptic because it may imply some fuzzy duty of lawyers to
work to effectuate the premises of the adversary system, some duty of
the lawyer to consider the larger interests of the public and of the society in which many lawyers prosper. But he never says so.
385. House of Delegates Proceedings, 108 A.B.A. ANN. REP. 289, 333-40.
386. Id. at 347-48.
387. House of Delegates Proceedings, 108 A.B.A. ANN. REP. 766-778 (1983) (adopting
Model Rules).
388. Id. at 767.
389. DISCUSSION DRAFT, supra note 86, pmbl.; PROPOSED FINAL DRAFT, supra note
82, pmbl.
390. House of Delegates Proceedings, supra note 387, at 767.
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The report of the Proceedings indicates no additional debate occurred. But someone called for a recorded vote, which suggests strong
feelings within the House. The request may have been made because
the delegate was uncomfortable charging a lawyer with any responsibility to see that “justice is being done.” Alternatively, the delegate
who requested a recorded vote may have wanted to renew attention to
the duty of lawyers to serve the public by seeing that justice, as well as
law, must be done. In any event, thirty-eight percent of the delegates
supported deleting the sentence.391
The optimism that fueled the Kutak Commission had largely departed the legal profession. In 1984, the ABA created a Commission
on Professionalism to attack the belief that “the Bar might be moving
away from the principles of professionalism and that it was so perceived by the public.”392 The Model Rules were intended to assuage
the public’s concern that lawyers cared only for their clients and themselves, and not necessarily in that order. As adopted by the House,
that goal for the Rules seemed farther out of reach.
In the language of law, lawyers were agents and their clients were
principals. The 2014 edition of Black’s Law Dictionary explains, “This
relationship is similar to that of master and servant, but that terminology applies to employments in which the employee has little or no
discretion, whereas the agent has considerable latitude.”393 Whether
a lawyer continued to possess the discretion to make him or her an
agent rather than a servant after adoption of the Rules became more
intensely debated by American lawyers. The triumph of legal skill394
reflected the end of the outward-looking lawyer, as well as the end of
optimism about the social good lawyers could accomplish. The Kutak
Commission tried. And its publicly-oriented ethics rules were found
wanting.

391. Id. at 767.
392. Report of the Commission on Professionalism, 111(2) A.B.A. ANN. REP. 369, 373
(1986).
393. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1385 (10th ed. 2014).
394. See Sara Randazzo & Jacqueline Palank, Legal Fees Cross New Mark: $1,500
an Hour, WALL ST. J., Feb. 9, 2016, at A1.

